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ABSTRACT
Multitasking-based failures of perception and action are the focus of much research in driving,
where they are attributed to distraction. Similar failures occur in contexts where the construct of
distraction is little used. Such narrow application was attributed to methodology which cannot
precisely account for experimental variables in time and space, limiting distraction’s conceptual
portability to other contexts. An approach based upon vigilance methodology was forwarded as a
solution, and highlighted a fundamental human performance question: Would increasing the
signal probability (SP) of a secondary task increase associated performance, as is seen in the
prevalence effect associated with vigilance tasks? Would it reduce associated performance, as is
seen in driving distraction tasks? A series of experiments weighed these competing assumptions.
In the first, a psychophysical task, analysis of accuracy and response data revealed an interaction
between the number of concurrent tasks and SP of presented targets. The question was further
tested in the applied contexts of driving, cyberattack and battlefield target decision-making. In
line with previous prevalence effect inquiry, presentation of stimuli at higher SP led to higher
accuracy. In line with existing distraction work, performance of higher numbers of concurrent
tasks tended to elicit slower response times. In all experiments raising either number of
concurrent tasks or SP of targets resulted in greater subjective workload, as measured by the
NASA TLX, even when accompanied by improved accuracy. It would seem that “distraction” in
previous experiments has been an aggregate effect including both delayed response time and
prevalence-based accuracy effects. These findings support the view that superior experimental
control of SP reveals nomothetic patterns of performance that allow better understanding and
wider application of the distraction construct both within and in diverse contexts beyond driving.
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CHAPTER ONE: AN INTRODUCTION TO DISTRACTION
When, in the course of multitasking, performance decrements in one task are due to
attentional allocation to a concurrent task, the condition can be viewed as a distraction from the
first task. Current research into distraction tends to center on a single context: that is, distraction
while driving (for a recent review see Caird, Johnston, Willness, Asbridge, & Steel, 2014, as
well as Hancock, Mouloua, & Senders, 2008; Young, Lee, & Regan, 2008). From abundant
findings which detail the dangers of roadway multitasking with mobile devices, the term
‘distracted driving’ has migrated into traffic law and popular use (Agnes, 2004). Scientific and
popular attention to distracted drivers is easily justified, given the quantifiable risks incurred by
engaging in a variety of in-vehicle tasks (Jerome, Ganey, Mouloua, & Hancock, 2002; Fitch et
al., 2013; Sawyer, Finomore, Calvo, & Hancock, 2014a). What remains puzzling is the rather
narrow focus of applied multitasking-based distraction research on this one context. Constructs
such as situational awareness (Eriksen, 1995; Smith & Hancock, 1995) and workload (Hancock
& Meshkati, 1988; Moray, 1979) are applied in a wide variety of contexts. It seems unreasonable
that distraction should exist only in the task of driving.
There are some findings of effects outside driving that might arguably fall under the
umbrella of distraction. Aviation research into pilot multitask use of heads-up displays while
landing (Fischer & Haines, 1980; Wickens & Long, 1994) has revealed costs to, for example,
detection of unexpected obstacles on the runway. Battlefield target detection (as in Yeh,
Wickens, & Seagull, 1999) involves similar multitasking decrements; as more information is
displayed to a dismounted combatant they become less likely to detect critical signals. In both of
these situations performing multiple tasks leads to poorer performance, but none are consistently
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referred to as ‘distraction’ within each of the respective associated literatures. If distraction has
the potential to occur in any multi-task situation, it so remains as yet unexplored in many
domains.

Defining Distraction in the Context of Driving
Although not the seminal driving distraction work, ‘Driven to distraction’ (Strayer &
Johnston, 2001) remains one of the most cited papers. In this work’s first experiment, of two
conducted, these authors made use of a driving-representative tracking-task to compare baseline
single-task driving to dual-task driving. Dual-task conditions included listening to the radio or
engaging in a conversation on a cell-phone. In terms of response time, no difference was found
between the baseline and the radio listening condition, however, a significant lengthening of
response times were recorded for participants conversing on a cell phone. These findings
suggested that something about responding to another human in conversation and/or generating
language incurred greater driving detriment than simply listening. In Strayer and Johnston’s
second experiment (2001), baseline single-task driving was compared to dual-task cell phone use
while driving, with participants either generating their own conversation, or simply repeating the
words of a confederate (i.e. ‘shadowing’). Participants drove continuously, and so rather than a
discrete measure interrupting driving (such as the response time to a brake car used in
experiment I), the continuous measure of root-mean-square error (RMSE) of steering was used.
The experiment was performed on both an easy and difficult driving course. Over the easy
course, the shadowing condition showed no significant differences from baseline driving. In
contrast, over the difficult course all three conditions, baseline, shadowing and generation,
illustrated a significant continuum of increasing impairment. These finding, it was suggested,
2

showed that a limited resource was being directed at two tasks. Further, in the phone task the
generation of language required more of that resource than listening alone. Performance in the
driving task was suffering due to attentional allocation to these concurrent tasks, a state reported
as “distraction from driving”.
The design of most distraction studies allows a statistical assessment as to whether
driving while using a device differs from baseline driving. In studies with multiple devices such
analysis may reveal differences that allow a rank ordering of relative disturbance by dependent
variable. This basic methodological strategy, the comparison of baseline driving performance to
multi-task performance with one or more devices or circumstances, has served as the template
for many of the additional studies that have followed. Exemplar findings from this body of
research include the effect’s extension to multitasking with devices beyond vocal use of cellular
phones, including in-vehicle entertainment (Chisholm, Caird, & Lockhart, 2008; Mouloua,
Hancock, Rinalducci, & Brill, 2003), food consumption (Young, Mahfoud, Walker, Jenkins, &
Stanton, 2008), text messaging (Drews, Yazdani, Godfrey, Cooper, & Strayer, 2009; Sawyer,
2010; Sawyer & Hancock, 2012), and even the use of next-gen heads-up displays (HUDs,
Sawyer et al., 2014a). Comparisons of the severity of detriment from individual devices have
also been conducted (as in Jerome et al., 2002; Strayer et al., 2013; Strayer, Turrill, Coleman,
Ortiz, & Cooper, 2014). The applied implication has been, and continues to be, that cellular
phones represent only one example in a diverse set of roadway distractions.
“Thieves of attention” (Hancock et al., 2008) transiently disengage the operator of a
vehicle from solely engaging in the role of ‘driver’ into other social roles. Billboards, for
example, invite the role of ‘consumer’, children invite the role of ‘parent’, and digital
communications devices, invite a veritable Pandora’s Box of roles, social and otherwise, into the
3

vehicle. Of course, even ‘driver’, as a role, entails a number of important tasks beyond driving
itself. These include ‘navigator’, ‘climate control specialist’, and ‘he who must remember milk’.
However most, if not essentially all, driving research identifies driving itself as the ‘primary’
task, and so compares baseline single-task performance to performance while engaged in one or
more ‘secondary’ tasks. This primacy, ontologically speaking, is a state assigned by the
researcher. Explicit instructions may be desirable, as primacy may not be obvious to participants
in the laboratory (Dressel & Atchley, 2008) and indeed on the road (Fitch et al., 2013). Such
transitions may even be induced; some attentional ‘thieves’ rely on a driver’s propensity to
switch roles. Roadside billboards, for example, would not exist if drivers never engaged with
them (Hancock et al., 2008), and so distraction they cause (as in Dukic, Ahlstrom, Patten,
Kettwich, & Kircher, 2013) can be said to be willfully engineered. Given that it is presently both
legal and common to build such attractive distractive tasks, how is the word “distraction” to be
understood?
Distraction etymologically derives from the Latin dis traho, to pull apart, and its
meanings in English center upon the undesirable pulling of attention (as compared to, for
example, the French distraction: a pleasurable diversion. See Room, Buchanan-Brown &
Pratchett, 2000). “Distraction” thus identifies an objectionable channel for attention, and
presupposes one preferable. The differentiator of these channels is clearly identified in the above
scientific literature on driving distraction: potential resultant harm. The distracted driver, by
attending to a distracting channel, is more likely to drive in a manner which risks a collision.
Collateral negative impacts range from disruption of the traffic stream through financial damage
up to the deaths of the driver and their victims. This argument is strongest in situations where no
reasonable virtue can be assigned to the task (or tasks) beyond driving, with social phone and
4

messaging use the most common example. Contrasting situations certainly exist. The idea of
competing risk is well and humorously illustrated in Hancock, Mouloua, and Senders’ (2008)
with the example of the discovery of a venomous snake in the car. Weighing potential resultant
harm in such a situation, a driver might rationally take up the task of “snake fighting” despite its
obvious distractive influence on the driving task. An epidemiological argument for virtue in nondriving tasks can be found in the logic of Swedish opponents of legislation banning in-vehicle
phone use, as the country became the last in the European Union to adopt such laws. These
rightly point out that driving itself is a hazardous activity and that ‘social messaging’ can shorten
overall driving time by, for example, sending a reminder that eliminates the need to drive back
out for milk. In Sweden, a country with long rural routes, this reduction in exposure (as
described in Kircher, Ahlström, Gregersen & Patten, 2013) is argued to outweigh other factors.
Finally, situations can be found where driving is the distraction. In desert military campaigns
roads can be long, straight, devoid of traffic, and vehicles driven highly robust to roadway
departures. Arial reconnaissance means lethal hazards, in the form of improvised explosive
devices (IED) or enemy combatants, may be relayed to drivers in advance, and specialized forces
dispatched to resolve the situation. The communication channel in such situations is of primary
importance, and any attention diverted from it increases the potential for resultant harm. In each
of these situations, an assessment of potential risks is necessary to determine which task is
primary and which secondary, which is distraction and which the human must not be distracted
from. Therefore, it can be said that the definition of distraction is fluid by context, and that
arguments based in an actuarial view of primacy are necessary for a researcher to apply the term.
Design, training, and legislation in driving, as in so many contexts, are filled with
decisions in which life is lost on both sides of a balance. Such Faustian pacts are difficult to
5

resolve scientifically, and so belong to the philosophical field of ethics, where they are often
considered within a framework known as “the trolley problem” (for a recent treatment see
Skulmowski, Bunge, Kaspar & Pipa, 2014). This thought experiment unfolds as follows: “a
vehicle (trolley) is moving toward a group of helpless people (tied to the tracks), and you, a
bystander, may pull a lever to divert it onto a track in which there are fewer helpless people (a
single unaware worker).” Those that choose to pull the lever reduce the overall loss of life but
become the agents of that smaller number of lives lost. Many variations have been posed since
the original (XXX), manipulating, for example, age, sex, relationship to and distance from those
that die, and each provides an interesting tool with which to understand trade-offs which involve
life. In this tradition, and pursuant to the present discussion, I pose a variant thought experiment:
“the distracted trolley”. “Given the number of serious reported trolley accidents, an operator now
sits in each trolley, ready to pull a lever and divert the vehicle to a side track. Monitoring the side
track and the main track is difficult, and so a technology has been developed with detects people
on the side tracks. When placed in the trolley, this technology naturally requires the operator’s
eyes and mind to be regularly removed from the main track. Is the technology a distraction?
Should it nonetheless be allowed in the trolley?” In order to provide a solid argument one way or
the other, there is a need for information. Factors include the predicted number of helpless
people tied to the main track, number of unaware workers on side tracks. Consider the operator’s
ability, the technology’s efficacy, and the efficacy of the human-machine system they comprise,
both in terms of the main track and side tracks. It is the collection and interpretation of such data
that have driven the previously detailed growth in the area of driver distraction.
The distracted trolley is real, and real world “operators” and “track-dwellers” alike have
elevated the term ‘driver distraction’ into law, and from there into common English discourse,
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where it became Webster’s’ ‘Word of the Year’ (Agnes, 2004). Primacy, and a resultant view of
just what constitutes distraction, may be clear in the case of social test-messaging but become
less so in the case of text-messaging professionals. Consider the data delivered to an ambulance
driver, which may simultaneously increase potential resultant harm on-road and reduce potential
resultant harm at a nearby medical emergency. Imagine the tracks, drivers surrounding the
ambulance on one, a man with a coronary infarction on the other. Should the technology be
allowed in the ambulance/trolley? Arguments can be made both ways. Arguments should be
made both ways. Design, training, and legislation resulting from the argument will result in life
being lost on both sides of the balance. It is through thought experiments like “the distracted
trolley” that an an actuarial view of primacy may be formed, and exported.
The widespread impact of the findings generated by driving distraction inquiry has not
been duplicated in non-driving domains. In order to better understand the success of distraction
studies in the context of driving, and great challenges of this construct in other contexts, it is
important to gain a broader view of what distraction is. As such, consider the following survey of
the psychological constructs and theories underlying the construct. This is presented with an eye
both to which existing bodies of knowledge are already used in distraction studies, and which
have potential to be used. Throughout, the question of why this useful and impactful construct,
distraction, remains widely unexploited outside a single context, driving, will remain central.

A Generalized View of Multitasking-based Attention and Distraction
William James said of attention “it is the taking possession by the mind, in clear and
vivid form, of one out of what seem several simultaneously possible objects or trains of thought.
Focalisation (sic), concentration of consciousness are of its essence. It implies withdrawal from
7

some things in order to deal effectively with others, and is a condition which has a real opposite
in the confused, dazed, scatterbrained state…”. The psychological study of distraction is
necessarily closely tied to that of attention, and both predates and extends beyond driving
research. In sexual research, distraction is studied relative to its ability to delay or prevent
orgasm (as in Geer & Fuhr, 1976). In this same vein, a line of research into the ability of
distraction to reduce or prevent pain also exists (as in McCaul & Malott, 1984). Auditory
distraction in the workplace has been described (see Beaman, 2005 for a review), and details loss
of efficiency and increases in training time. Clinical deficit study of distraction centers on
disorders of attention and executive function, including attention deficit disorder (ADD) (as
detailed in a seminal piece Driven to Distraction by Hallowell & Ratey, 2011, which shares its
name with a seminal driving paper). In applied psychology the word distraction is applied to
similar dysfunction, albeit with a different root cause. Distraction here is undesirable departures
from perception and action directed toward desirable tasks. The shift, therefore, is one toward
perception and action relevant to less desirable tasks, and a neglect of the primary task.
Neglect of a task does not always mean it stops; few of life’s activities occur in the
vacuum of competition referred to as ‘single-tasking’. Individuals proverbially ‘walk and chew
bubblegum’ through life, multitasking in myriad task and subtask combinations. Such rapid,
autonomous skill execution is the hallmark of experienced multiple-task performance (Fitts &
Posner, 1967). Learning to drive is an excellent example of such skill acquisition (Anderson,
1983), as the task driving is itself a constellation of a series of subtasks. When first learning, rapt
attention must be given to each, and novice drivers must be taught sequences of subtask
operations by rote. In short order, however, drivers find these previously cumbersome
combinations so easy as to engage in a complex secondary tasks, like messaging. Their
8

confidence notwithstanding, as shown by Strayer and Johnston in the context of driving (2001),
resources available for such concurrent performance of tasks are limited. Drivers, and indeed all
who seek to conserve limited cognitive resources, often perform not to the best of their ability,
but to the minimum requirements of the present situation. This act is known as satisficing
(Simon, 1969), and further frees resources for peripheral tasks. When attention is divided
between tasks, resource supply and demand is the arbiter of performance. Within said divide,
stimuli must actually be available for perception and action; situations which remove or occlude
stimuli are not distraction (Hancock et al., 2008). However, divided attention can result in failure
to perceive available stimuli, as in change blindness, in which attending closely to one set of
stimuli renders another set of clearly apparent stimuli cognitively ‘invisible’ (Simons &
Ambinder, 2005). The above ideas of divided attention and multitasking are closely related, with
the primary difference between the two being the locus of inference. When an individual engages
in more than one task, the result is multitasking, whereas when an individual has their attention
divided across multiple stimuli, the result is divided attention. For clarity, the term multitasking
has been used preferentially in the present work.

9

Figure 1: The perception-action cycle
The perception-action cycle (from Neisser, 1976) describes a loop of sampling the environment
through sensory organs, using that information to modify knowledge of the world, and
responding by directing or withholding action. Resultant changes to the environment require resampling, which in turn starts the cycle again.

Multitasking-based distraction should first be considered within the framework of the
perception-action cycle (Figure 1). An organism samples the environment through sensory
organs, uses that information to modify knowledge of the world, responds by directing or
withholding action, and samples the impact on the environment which in turn starts the cycle
again (Neisser, 1976; Smith & Hancock, 1995). While the organism may make interactive
changes, it is also able to react to changes stemming from outside agents or forces; it is changes
within the environment which are the impetus for re-engaging in the cycle (Gibson, E., 1969;
Gibson, J., 1979). Such capabilities are underwritten by anatomical organization; humans share
with other organisms a functional dichotomy of structure in which sensory (perception) nerves
are largely attached to the anterior nerve axis while motor (action) nerves are largely attached to
the posterior (Betz, 1874). As such, it is unsurprising that the perception-action cycle underlies
10

diverse psychological constructs, such as attention, memory, situational awareness, and
distraction. Multitasking-based distraction, in this light, might be framed as concurrent
performance of tasks requiring multiple concurrent perception-action cycles, each of which
becomes more likely to experience delay and/or failure. With such complexity available, literally
at our fingertips, it is surprising that the cycles within cycles do not more often end in confusion
and failure. Certainly, observers must have protections against overindulging in the sheer volume
of perception and action available in the environment around them.

Modeling Theft of Attention
Observers are able, and sometimes unable, to avoid being overwhelmed by the variety
and complexity their world. Consider perception of, and action in response to, a complex visual
scene: objects in the real world reflect light to the eyes of an observer, where it is encoded
preliminarily at the retinas. The resultant information is transmitted to the brain, processed, and
then informs decision-making to guide action. Human observers lack infinite processing
capacity, and so must have the ability to limit processing demand. This inferred existence of a
protective mechanism is the basis of the filter model of attention (Broadbent, 1958), which
proposes that the brain filters sensory information at an early stage of processing so as to focus
only on necessary stimuli. While this model successfully generalizes to many situations, it
cannot explain the ability of humans to recognize and attend to irrelevant information streams
when they become suddenly relevant, for example attending to one’s own name in a previously
‘filtered’ conversation (Moray, 1959), or presumably identifying a string of sudden brake lights
in a roadway lane adjoining the one of travel. If relevant, timely semantic cues can be extracted
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from supposedly ‘filtered’ stimuli, it seems likely that any filtering must occur far enough into
processing to extract this meaning (Deutsch & Deutsch, 1963).
This debate, surrounding early selection and late selection filter models, has only begun
to cool relatively recently, in part due to the introduction of new hybrid models that account for
aspects of each. Load theory (Lavie, 1995; 2005; 2010), suggested that protective filter
mechanisms only come into effect when processing capacity is in danger of being reached or
exceeded. Load theory relies on the concept of executive control to explain how observers
choose which channels are attended to in the absence of spare capacity. Such a theory for control
of attention in overload situations is close, in terms of definition, to that previously offered for
distraction. In evaluating the applicability of load theory to distraction, it is worth considering the
most common methodology used in this paradigm. Speeded discrimination tasks using simple
(i.e. letter, basic shape) stimuli are manipulated by the addition of irrelevant, non-critical signals
introduced in the periphery. The influence of a ‘distractor’ is then measured in terms of response
time decrement (Lavie, 1995). Elements of this design match well with driving distraction work,
in which a discrimination task (identifying brake lights) is responsible for alerting the driver to
engage in a speed sensitive response task, and a distractor (secondary task) is introduced in the
periphery. Load theory would suggest that at higher levels of overall workload, distractors exert
less influence. Indeed, when participants are required to make more complex discriminations
(features only vs a multiple conjunction search), distractive decrement are reduced. This effect
holds even when distractors are complex, as in the case of the introduction of cartoon characters
by Beck and Lavie (2005), or when distractions are internal, as in the ‘mind wandering’ reports
studied by Forster and Lavie (2011). In each case higher load tasks remain less affected by
distractive stimuli.
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These findings are interesting in the context of driving, a task with long periods of
relatively low demand punctuated with brief periods of very high demand (see Miyake, Hancock,
& Manning, 1992). This so called “hours of boredom, moments of terror” task landscape is
shared with many other domains (Hancock, 1997), and in conjunction with the findings from
load theory suggest the following questions. Is the low workload majority of the time spent at
such ‘boredom and terror’ tasks also the time when individuals are most susceptible to
distractions? How quickly, during a transition from boredom to terror, do high-load protections
from distractive influences become available? Once the transition has occurred, how long does
the state last? Such a transition seems strikingly close to the idea of hysteresis, in which load
from a task continues to affect performance on a second task even after the first ends. Further,
when the line between any momentary distractor and the nominally vital task is not always clear,
might such fixation be not protective, but a problem? Consider the phenomenon of cognitive
tunneling, in which fixation on one task prevents engagement with another necessary task
(Dirkin, 1983; Dirkin & Hancock, 1985; Thomas & Wickens, 2001), a cases where a desirable
transition may be slow or simply fail to occur. Load theory, then, suggests one explanation for
driving distraction. When a secondary in-vehicle task becomes primary, even briefly, the driver
becomes less sensitive to stimuli in the roadway environment. As long as load remains so
elevated, the transition back to the driving task may be inhibited.
Load theory, as a form of basic experimental work, is nominally unconcerned with
addressing such applied realities, but does suggest applicability to known applied phenomenon.
When multiple tasks are undertaken simultaneously, success of the overall effort is defined by
the ability to smoothly maintain and transition between all subtasks. This may be analogous to
the ability to abandon interaction with a distractive influence and move back to a critical task.
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However, it also suggests that at high load levels individuals may be less likely to engage with
distractive influences. This may underlie the phenomenon seen in driving of slowing when under
high workload from dual-task device use (as in Törnros & Bolling, 2006; Sawyer & Hancock,
2013; Sawyer et al., 2014a). Drivers may actually be reducing load until they are able to engage
in the secondary task effectively, essentially satisficing (Simon, 1969) until capable of
multitasking. More generally, the above findings in sum are yet another affirmation that effort
level and collateral resource use are vital considerations in multitasking-based distraction.

Effort and Risk of Failure
The effort involved in a task can be said to be directly related to the toll it takes on
resources in order to meet demands, and can be referred to as workload. Workload is primarily
collected through subjective self-report measures. Among the most popular of these is the NASA
task load index (NASA-TLX, Hart & Staveland, 1988), which provides reliable assessment
across six dimensions of workload. Effort, performance, frustration, mental demand, physical
demand and temporal demand may be assessed individually, or averaged to provide a composite
workload score. The NASA-TLX also contains a series of forced-choice questions identifying
the importance of the contribution of each component. In practice such questions are often
omitted due to experiment time constraints. It is notable that the NASA-TLX was validated in a
variety of multitasking situations. These include a) similar concurrent tasks, b) “Fittsberg” tasks,
in which the output of a memory search task (Sternberg, 1969) provides the input for a sorting
task (Fitts & Peterson, 1964), and c) full multitask, multimodal supervisory control (Hart &
Staveland, 1988). The NASA-TLX remains the most used self-report workload technique, and is
generally well-regarded in the human factors community and beyond. Nonetheless, it suffers
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from potential shortfalls that can be levied against any subjective scale; namely whether
respondents are willing or indeed able to accurately report their own internal states and
experiences (Natsoulas, 1967), and whether retrospective reports are more susceptible to
memory concerns. This line of inquiry rapidly reverts to a philosophical debate on functionalism
(see Block, 1980 for contrasts with physicalism), but also highlights a number of related practical
concerns. Tasks competing for similar resources require more effort to perform in tandem, and so
adding a subjective assessment technique in real time invites failure of the task or, speculatively,
in the meta-cognition needed for accurate self-assessment.
In addressing this issue, various attempts at passive measurement of workload through
physiological measures have been attempted. In general, these measures attempt to quantify
arousal directly, as in electroencephalographic (EEG) monitoring (Hancock & Szalma, 2003), or
by proxy through measuring resource use, as in trans-cranial doppler (TCD) (Shaw et al., 2009)
or heart rate variability (Veltman & Gaillard, 1996). Although many such techniques show
promising patterns, these tools are relatively new. Different techniques tend to show different
results, and all have varying degrees of agreement with established measures like the TLX
(Hancock & Szalma, 2003). What is more, not all task combinations produce the same level of
workload. Notably, spanning information across several sensory modalities has long been shown
to moderate overall workload, as compared to moving the same information across a single
modality (Wickens, 2002).
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Figure 2: Wickens’ multiple resource theory (MRT)
Wickens’ (2002) ‘box model’, multiple resource theory (MRT) presented visually, represents the
potential outlets for cognitive resources, and identifies overlaps where resource use may be
exacerbated. For example the model indicates that driving and text messaging, both primarily
visual and spatial tasks, would require more resources when performed in tandem than driving
and listening to audio books, an auditory and verbal task. It is notable that in ‘stages’ perception
and cognition occupy the same space.

To understand the concurrent performance of tasks and subtasks across modalities as well
as the perception-action cycle, one popular model is multiple resource theory (MRT, see
Wickens, 2002). Wickens’ box model (Figure 2) builds off evidence that cognitive work relies
upon differential resources which are limited in nature, and may be fluidly redirected to multiple
tasks. In multitasking, such direction of resources is not a zero-sum (as in Von Neumann, 1953).
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Tasks which draw on similar resources are anticipated to produce greater interference, leading to
reduced performance and enhanced likelihood of task failure. Notably, MRT as a model
combines the perception-action cycle stages of perception and cognition together. This
competition can include gross physical or “structural” limitations. Foveal fixations, for example,
are constrained by the physical speed with which the six extraocular muscles can throw and
catch their organ. The competition can also include cognitive processing, likely constrained by
the rate at which the body can provide blood, oxygen, and thus energy, to the brain. Under such
constraints a compound task like texting-while-driving might be modeled as two concurrent
visio-manual tasks with physical and manual response elements, which compete for a limited
pool of resources. As resources are exhausted, failures of perception or response result.
A debate exists as to whether a) perception-based visio-manual structural interference or
b) working memory and processing based cognitive interference is the larger contributor to
driving distraction and associated workload (Strayer & Johnston, 2001). A growing body of
empirical work presently shows that, in driving, cognitive factors are involved in the lion’s share
of distraction-related elevations in workload and detriment (see He, McCarley, & Kramer, 2013;
Sawyer et al., 2014a). However, this support of the cognitive interference hypothesis is not
unanimous, and it is indeed difficult to argue that failing to look at the road is not detrimental to
safe passage (McCallum, Campbell, Richman, Brown, & Wiese, 2004; Owens, McLaughlin, &
Sudweeks, 2011). Structural interference undoubtedly does contribute to overall workload
elevation, but it should also be noted that it is more easily observed. Psychology exists now a
scant half-century from a time when consideration of ‘internal processes’ was a taboo subject
precisely because evidence of their existence cannot be directly observed (Skinner, 1977). Early
inquiries literally ‘showed’ structural interference and it seems likely that such readily
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observable phenomenon fueled an availability heuristic-based (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973)
erroneous perception that it is the major contributor. Such a perception is not limited to science.
Hands-free headsets or dashboard systems do little or nothing to reduce the detriment of talking
and driving (Strayer & Johnston, 2001; Backer-Grøndahl & Sagberg, 2011), and yet they are
allowed on military bases, and on the roads of the majority of states (Ibrahim, Anderson, Burris,
& Wagenaar, 2011). Such policy is the very manifestation of availability heuristic-based
erroneous acceptance of the structural interference hypothesis. Still, the limited driving
distraction policy that does exist is a reflection of the consensus between these two theoretical
views. Both the cognitive and structural interference perspectives support the underlying concept
that multitasking effort is resource driven, limited, and can lead to failure.

Figure 3: The Hancock-Warm model
The Hancock-Warm model (1989), shown in A) three dimensions with the constructs of
Information Rate and Information Structure as dual base axes. In B) two dimensions the region
of comfort, which is the core of the left-hand model, is revealed to give way to adaptation,
dynamic instability, and failure through either hypostress or hyperstress.

Each of the above ideas addresses factors that might influence failure, and so the study of
failure is worth addressing here. The present preeminent model is that developed by Hancock
and Warm (1989), who examined failures in the context of sustained attention, but produced a
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model that is broadly applicable to many tasks where attention mediates performance (Figure 3).
As individuals navigate the environment, dynamic change provides challenges which threaten
the goal at hand. The model is rooted in the concept of homeostasis, a trait passed down from the
thermal stress models preceding it (Hancock, 1986), and describes a progression from stability to
either overload or underload states. Failure occurs upon exhaustion of resources required to
counter such adverse environmental pressures, and is not instantaneous. Instead it is described
(Hancock & Warm, 1989) as “dynamic instability”, a progressive inability to respond adaptively
which results in performance dropping ever more rapidly until a state of complete functional
failure is reached. This nomothetic description of failure does not preclude individual
differences, and indeed such idiographic variations are expected (for a discussion of nomothetic
and idiographic patterns, see Cone, 1986). Still, in situations of high load when resources are at a
premium, available response strategies to avoid failure dwindle, then disappear.

Time, and Stopping in It
In situations where task failure has become a possibility, what strategies can minimize the
chance of such an unfavorable ending? Clues can be found by comparing the ideas of the
Hancock and Warm model (1989) with the findings of load theory (Lavie, 2010), in which under
high levels of load distractors exert reduced influence. In both sets of findings, as load on the
cognitive system increases so variation of response decreases. Ideally, the response chosen will
successfully lead to a reduction in load, and a return to stability. Indeed, in situations where a
‘Moment of Terror’ (Hancock, 1997) is successfully navigated, the response chosen can be said
to have been sufficiently appropriate, and the transition to engaging in it to have occurred in a
sufficiently timely manner. The goal of systems deployed into environments where such high
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load crisis may occur should be to enable such timely and correct responses. In the system of
law, driving-while-multitasking bans (Ibrahim et al., 2011) attempt to facilitate timely and
correct response by prohibiting known dangerous concurrent tasks (i.e. messaging and driving).
In the context of civilian motor-vehicle operation, this kind of prohibitory message is
appropriate, if potentially not sufficient. Lawbreaking aside, the earlier discussion of primacy
and “the distracted trolley” highlights contexts in which failing to multitask is not the rational or
ethical choice. Emergency vehicle operators and those engaged in military operations rely on
concurrent tasks for the mission as a whole to succeed. Drunk drivers may be court ordered to
use distractive devices (Sawyer & Hancock, 2014). Where prohibition is not appropriate, design
interventions must instead minimize risk, again by enabling timely and correct responses.
Resultant interfaces would, ideally, preserve workload in the course of multitasking and afford
smooth transitions to appropriate “final responses”.
How does one build interfaces which do not simply reduce the number of concurrent
tasks, but provide superior information delivery to reduce the duration, frequency and resource
cost of tasks engagement? One answer can be found in dividing ‘single tasks’ such as messaging
into representative constellations of a series of subtasks, each corresponding to an interface
element. Each is a potential affordance, and each individual contribution builds the aggregate
distraction potential. As such, in tasks that can be engineered there is a need to understand the
available components. Indeed, in a macro sense, the field of driving distraction is engaged in
such an endeavor even now, with studies isolating the potential gains of using voice recognition
(He et al., 2013; Strayer et al., 2014a), HUDs (Sawyer et al., 2014a; Tippey, Sivaraj, Ardoin,
Roady, & Ferris, 2014), and other new interface one comparison at a time. The arduous nature of
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such undertakings aside, there is one cause for concern with the analysis of in-vehicle interface
as described: time.
When measuring discrete roadway events (as in Sawyer & Hancock, 2013; 2014; Drews
et al., 2009; and many of the works described in Caird et al., 2014), participant free will creates
difficulties with precise temporal placement of a treatment relative to a measured behavior. How
can a researcher ever be certain the use of a potentially distracting roadway device will coincide
with the measurement of a dependent variable when the participant can do whatever they wish?
A number of strategies can be used to compensate. For example, experimenters can flood the
duration of the experiment with the manipulation (Figure 4A), under the correct assumption that
when a participant never stops performing the task, the issue of temporal placement becomes less
of an issue, or at least a less obvious issue. In continuous manipulations, for example
conversational vocal cell phone use (as in Strayer, Drews & Johnston, 2003), this strategy is
arguably quite a naturalistic one, although not representative of many shorter vocal
communications. In a discrete manipulations, such as delivery of messages (as in Sawyer &
Hancock, 2013; Sawyer et al., 2014a; for a review of such studies see Caird et al., 2014) flooding
is less optimal. For example, Drews and colleagues (2009), presented 42 brake events at
“freeway speeds”. Sawyer and Hancock (2013) sent text messages continuously, a new one
delivered as soon as the previous message had been responded to, while a single brake event was
measured. It is difficult to argue that either situation proves to be a common handling of tasks
within time on the road. Further, the amount that participants indulge in a manipulation may be
affected by the participants’ abilities, as in faster text-messaging typists, or by the affordances of
a given experiment. Some studies code matches between messaging activity and response
maneuvers, and then analyze (Drews et al., 2009), giving the relative levels of activity in which
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participants chose to indulge. Still, results of this sort still arguably lack strong experimental
control. Replication, then, becomes problematic.

Figure 4: A driving study utilizing epoch-based methods
A) A pace car experiment, in which the participant’s car (blue, left) follows a computer
controlled lead car (black, right) which brakes at predetermined points seemingly random to the
participant. At the same time the participant is sent messages (here, SMS text messages). In such
a paradigm, the free will of the participant makes it impossible to ensure consistent temporal
placement of the message relative to the brake event (in red, Figure A shows such an alignments,
but note that it is in no way guaranteed). In order to get some of the treatment effect (messaging)
to overlap the event producing the dependent variable (brake event) the environment may be
flooded with one or the other. This can lead to suboptimal experimental procedure that deviates
considerably from real-world situations. B) Device status reporting (DSR) allows the precise
targeting of a brake event contingent upon user interaction with a device. In the described project
(Sawyer et al., 2014a) a user unlocked the phone and 1800ms later the leading pace car braked
sharply. C) In the present example a brake event is targeted to time when the participant is
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reading, but the system could likewise be used to trigger actions in the simulation relative to any
user interaction event.

In discussing such tactics, consider the idea of hysteresis (as in Morgan & Hancock,
2011), in which load from an event continues to affect performance for a span of time. Flooding
tactics rely upon hysteresis effects to ‘smooth out’ load, which is likely effective but can ignore
or even mask the concentration of the manipulation within the time of the experiment. By way of
metaphor, consider the validity of a drug study in which all participants are administered a five
drug cocktail. Further assume that dosage is not controlled; availability of the drugs and
unmonitored propensity of participants to indulge decides dosage levels. The consideration that
each drug has a duration of effect is not an argument for experimental control. While naturalistic
studies must contend with such issues, in an experimental setting such lack of control is
suboptimal, greatly limiting the useful information such a study might provide. In driving
distraction studies, a similar lack of precision creates issues with interpretation. Larger trends,
such as the detrimental effects of multitasking, can be compared between studies (as in Caird et
al., 2014), but the finer details that might allow the construction of better interface are less
replicable. Hysteresis should be studied in its own right, not used to mask the effects of poor
independent variable control.
A different approach was used by Sawyer and colleagues (2014a) when comparing
Google Glass and an Android Smartphone. This project ‘built’ the serendipity to precisely
overlap an on-road event with an in-vehicle task, a kind of coincidence that had in past work
been created through flooding (as in Drews et al, 2009, but see Hancock & De Ridder, 2003 for a
previous example). The technique was dubbed device status reporting (DSR, see Figure 4 as well
as Sawyer, Calvo, Finomore, & Hancock, 2015a). In it, the transmission of timestamps for any
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given action on a device transmitted throughout the system allowed stimuli, such as a brake
event from a pace car, to be accurately targeted within a specific component of the interface
(Figure 4C). As a message was received the driver would 1) use a head-nod gesture to unlock the
device, 2) read the message on a screen presented above forward vision, 3) consider a reply, 4)
issue a voice command to reply and dictate the reply, 5) wait for transcription, check the message
for accuracy, and wait for the device to lock. In the experiment, a brake event was targeted to
component 2, reading. Analysis technique was borrowed from event related potential (ERP)
research (see Luck, 2014; Sawyer, 2014). Data was analyzed by defining epochs, time windows
for each participant starting at time-locked responses measured by DSR or the time synchronized
simulator’s data collection. By looking at levels of dependent variables within these time-locked
windows, the contribution of the created high load dual-task event to driving and recovery could
be evaluated.
To drivers so caught reading a message during a roadway brake event, Glass did provide
some benefits over the use of a smartphone, although mainly in terms of recovery, as analyzed
by this epoch method. In terms of discrete response time, participants showed no significant
differences (Sawyer et al., 2014a). Despite a novel ‘heads-up’ display, it appears that Google
Glass does not provide reading drivers protections against the slowed response of multitasking.
In the present example, it is easy to see how another interface affordance, for example the headnod gesture, could be compared to the smartphone unlock-gesture equivalent. The use of DSR
triggering of events to target subtasks reveals new possibilities in terms of managing and
recording time within driving distraction experiments. This strategy, however, does not directly
address how to handle time in research design and analysis.
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In many contexts, there is a need to build interfaces that allow operators to successfully
navigate high-load multitask situations. Strayer and Johnston’s (2001) experiments contain seeds
of the successes and challenges of fourteen years, to date, of such inquiry. Their methodology
provides a strong tool to look at the broad patterns of workload that stem from engaging in
complex tasks alongside one vital and itself complex, driving. However, as the field turns toward
more nuanced questions, more precise tools are needed. Without such, experimental tasks
conducted in the laboratory may have little advantage, in terms of experimental control, over
naturalistic work (such as Fitch et al., 2013). It is important to further consider that such lack of
control may be why the construct of distraction, popular in the context of driving, has made so
little headway in other domains.
What is needed, then, is a framework which can account for time, and the relative
concentration of experimental variables within it. This framework must necessarily account for
space as well: in many tasks naturalistic movement through time entails movement through
space. In experimental stimuli, the ‘terrain’ of such space/time may necessarily be quite different
from that encountered in naturalistic settings. It is impossible to predict what creative solutions
will be found by researchers in the abstraction of applied tasks. Present driving distraction
methodology allows great flexibility in addressing such experimental issues, and therefore any
candidate framework should as well. It further seems unwise to build some new, untested
standard for driving distraction work, which would likely never be used outside this work (see
Figure 5). The goal, therefore, will be to build on a known and accepted technique. Ideally,
advantages should be paired with backward compatibility to methodology used in (and
methodologists used to) existing distraction experimentation.
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Figure 5: The problem with new standards
The goal of the present work is not to build a new standard for driving distraction, but rather to
appropriate one already in use and apply it to driving distraction. The resultant cross-pollination
would ideally result in a stronger methodological framework for driving distraction work, while
providing distraction as a construct for use in more diverse contexts (XKCD, 2011).
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CHAPTER TWO: TOWARD A FRAMEWORK FOR DISTRACTION STUDY
The present empirical question is whether a superior alternative to existing methods of
evaluating multitasking-borne performance decrements can be identified. This is the task
attacked here. Any alternative must offer a) a framework which can accurately specify
space/time and the relative concentrations of experimental variables within and b) integration
with existing methodologies, to include equivalent flexibility in supporting self-determined
driver behavior. Ideally, a solution will incorporate an existing methodological standard, and will
support a wide range of experimental designs. As such, the effort will first look to widely used,
versatile experimental standards outside driver distraction research.

Vigilant Attention
In light of the above requirements, one particularly promising area is vigilance, also
referred to as vigilant attention or sustained attention (Warm & Jerison, 1984; Hancock, 2013,
for an excellent review see Warm, Finomore, Vidulick, & Funke, 2015). This line of research has
been heavily influenced by the methods and principles developed by Norman Mackworth, an
experimental psychologist investigating failures in radar operator attention for The Royal Air
Force (Mackworth, 1948; 1950). His “Clock Task” looked to conceptually replicate the
operational requirements of such wartime observers. In the clock task, participants viewed a
blank timepiece with only a single hand, which advanced in one second increments. At
apparently random times the hand would jump two increments, and it was this double jump
which constituted a critical signal to which participants were asked to respond. Mackworth’s
study revealed vigilance as a particular form of observational task differentiated by a strong
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performance decrement over time. Mackworth found that the rate of events (event rate or ER)
retarded detection while speed of response also decreased (Mackworth, 1969; Guralnick, 1973;
Parasuraman, 1979). As the probability of any given event containing a critical signal, or signal
probability (SP), declined, the result was also retarded detection rates and decreased speed of
detection (Mackworth, 1970; Warm & Jerison, 1984). In the worst-case scenario of a low SP,
high ER task, operator speed and accuracy can quickly dip to dangerous levels of performance,
instability, and failure (as in Hancock & Warm, 1989). This danger, and various strategies to
mitigate it, have been studied in diverse contexts including aviation, medical monitoring, cyberdefense, and driving (Warm et al., 2015; Sawyer, Finomore, Funke & Warm, 2014b; and see
Matthews & Desmond, 2002). Across such mitigation work, cuing (Hitchcock et al., 2003) and
knowledge of results (KR, Hitchcock, Dember, Warm, Moroney, & See, 1999) feature
prominently among strategies that can improve outcomes. At present, this broad and welldeveloped body of inquiry has produced methodologies which have benefited from an early and
prolonged attention to the roles of time and probability.
Although the central thrust of the present effort is the analysis of the vigilance framework
as a candidate for exploring multitasking-based decrements to performance, it is worth briefly
acknowledging that vigilance decrements have been sought, and found, in driving tasks. Long
haul drivers experience a linear elevation of response time with increased time on task (Schmidt
et al., 2007). There is evidence that such decrements, within the driving task, are minor and
uncommon (Parasuraman & Nestor, 1991). This, along with the difficulty of differentiating
vigilance decrement from fatigue may account for the scarcity of research directly addressing
vigilance in driving tasks (Matthews & Desmond, 2002). Presently, it is the use of driving in the
framework of a vigilance task which will be further explored.
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In general, vigilance experiments share a clear and useful set of methodological
affordances to deal with time. First, they clearly describe time relative to the presentation of
various classes of stimuli. In a typical vigilance experiment a series of candidate signals,
comprised of both critical signal and background (non-signal) events, are presented. Critical
signals are clearly detectable to observers, but are presented at unpredictable times and may be
missed during the ongoing task. The ratio of critical events to total (background + critical) events
is referred to as SP and presented as a percentage (i.e. 1% would constitute a single signal and 99
background events) which can therefore be calculated as the quotient of number of critical
signals over total signals presented. Events are most frequently presented at a consistent speed,
which is referred to as the ER and is generally expressed in terms of events per minute (ex. 6
events/minute). The interval length (ex. 10 seconds) is sometimes also produced, and in this form
event presentation speed is generally referred to as the inter-stimuli interval (ISI). A second
advantage offered by the vigilance experiment methodology is an extensive set of well
understood principles and basic procedure that allow for the control of uncertainty. For example,
within the ISI of each event one or more stimuli, each a candidate signal, can be displayed. This
approach allows a tight control of the complexity of the environment. In arrays of multiple
candidate signals, the regular temporal pattern of the ER can lead to strategies (ex. on each event
scan left to right) which facilitate detection (as in Warm & Jerison, 1984). Likewise, regular
spatial patterns facilitate strategic perception (Adams & Boulter, 1964; Helton, Weil,
Middlemiss, & Sawers, 2010). Temporal uncertainty can be increased by varying the ISI. For
example, providing multiple temporal initiation points for signals within the window of each
event while holding presentation time constant provides additional entropy to the observer while
preserving the temporal structure and ER of the experiment (Adams & Boulter, 1964; Moore &
29

Gross, 1973). Spatial uncertainty can be increased by simply moving stimuli around the overall
display environment within each event (Helton et al., 2010). Many more methodological
permutations exist for vigilance. The breadth of the current body of work is such that, with
knowledge of a particular need, it is quite probable a similar question has already been
addressed.
One great challenge to using the vigilance experimental methodology in a dynamic
performance situation such as driving distraction is the requirement to preserve the free will of
the operator. ER, in vigilance experiments, violates this requirement by holding constant the rate
of exploration of the environment. Operators move through their environment at a pace of their
own choosing unless a system or other constraint prevents them. Naturalistically, such
impedance can occur on the individual level, as with the decisions and judgements of the driver.
Personal convictions, phobias and habits are examples of such individual impediments to
exploration. It may also occur on the social level, as with rules or conventions. Law and religious
prohibition are an example of such social impediments to exploration. Finally, the force of
interference can be natural, driven by the causal and entropic developments in the environment
surrounding the operator. The incursion of foreign bodies into a task space, in addition to
weather and other so-called “acts of god” fall into this category (Hancock, 2013). Nonnaturalistic impediments, for example those arising from the experiment itself, call the goal of
naturalistic, environmentally valid experimentation into question. The control and rigor of the
rigid ER framework on which vigilance experiments are built can stand in opposition to these
goals.
How can flexible but rigorous management be realized? In driving distraction work, the
driver may have a goal speed, but will likely not adhere to it. The chosen speed of movement
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through the environment may in fact be information bearing. Adherence to speed, as a dependent
variable, can signify workload (Törnros & Bolling, 2006; Sawyer & Hancock, 2013; Sawyer et
al., 2014a) just as adherence to lane center does. Placing lateral or longitudinal control on a ‘rail’,
so to speak, that is to allow speed to be set by the experimenter in a kind of mandatory cruise
control, works contrary to a naturalistic approach to driving. A very similar issue has been
encountered in work seeking to generalize vigilance methodology to complex video game
environments (Szalma, Schmidt, Teo, & Hancock, 2014). Despite the fact that video games
generally afford the player control of exploration of the environment, in this experiment speed
and direction were controlled by the experimenters. This methodological choice was in line with
traditional vigilance work, and enhanced experimental control. It also placed the participant in
the less naturalistic role of passive observer. In driving distraction work, where the present trend
is toward naturalistic observation, such artificiality would not be tolerated by the community. It
seems likely that the idea of directly adapting vigilance experimental methodology to address
driving distraction is not possible. As this work seeks to achieve this aim, the question becomes
where a more flexible approach might be found. In doing so, can the many advantages of the
vigilance experimental approach be made portable?

Self-paced Search
An additional candidate framework may be found in a task used by Wolfe, Horowitz, and
Kenner (2005) to explore the effects of SP on visual search detection rates. In what is referred to
in this work as a self-paced search task (SPS task), 1) participants engage in a series of trials
containing multiple critical and background stimuli. Crucially, unlike a vigilance task, 2) the rate
of exposure to trials is left up to the observer. The task environment can be observed at the
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participant’s leisure before providing a response. The absence or presence of a critical signal is
reported; 3) response is binary. 4) Exercising either option advances the observer to the next
‘event’, with its associated stimuli. As in vigilance tasks, spatial uncertainty can be used in SPS
tasks to increase difficulty (Adams & Boulter, 1964). This method has similarities to other
forced-choice approaches used in visual search (see Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974; Eriksen, 1995).
When performed with a manipulation of SP, the SPS task produced has produced in accord with
previous vigilance work; lower SP levels led to reduced performance (Warm & Jerison, 1984).
The ER in an SPS task deserves a moment of special consideration: as participants
respond their response times are also their speed of passage through the task, and the
environment formed by its stimuli. ER, therefore, can be calculated as the sum of all reaction
times within a period of interest over the number of events within that period of interest. Even
though ER is here relegated to the role of dependent variable, as in vigilance faster ER is
associated with lower accuracy (Fleck & Mitroff, 2007). It is also logically associated with faster
response times, overall. Parenthetically, no significant effect of time of task, the central feature
of vigilance experiments, is generally found in these SPS studies (Wolfe et al., 2005; Fleck &
Mitroff, 2007). Thousands of stimuli are presented over long periods, and the principal
difference methodologically is the change from ER as an independent variable to a dependent
variable. It seems likely the “passive observer” status of those in vigilance tasks may therefore
hold some responsibility for eliciting the vigilance decrement (and see Hancock, 2013). The
change of ER from independent variable to dependent variable in SPS tasks leads to another
interesting possibility: enforcing a minimum or maximum ER. The former is a strategy that has
been used to determine if the loss of response in low SP conditions was merely a symptom of
moving too quickly through the stimuli (Wolfe et al., 2007). The task used involved playing a
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series of beeps when the participant moved above the ‘speed limit’. This had the effect of
slowing response times, but not of eliminating the prevalence effect, leading authors to conclude
that no mere speed-accuracy shift was taking place. The other option offered, enforcing a
maximum ER, is one that is more interesting in light of driving distraction research. In such an
experiment the participant would move at their own pace up to the maximum ER for the
presented stimuli, at which point the event would be terminated, any critical signals coded as a
miss, and the participant moved forward to the next event. In other words, a passive observer
would experience some or all events within an SPS experiment much as a classical vigilance
task, but could in always choose to take a more active role and move through the stimuli at a
faster pace. Such a hybrid SPS/vigilance task approach to ER has practical parity in the task of
driving, where a driver moves forward at the speed of their choosing, but obstacles (critical
signals) impose an imperative to respond before the ‘end’ of the event. This hybrid is, however,
speculative.
The SPS task, as described above, is a framework potentially capable of being used in a
driving, and therefore other complex contexts. This endorsement must come with following
caveats. First, in some applied tasks movement through the environment is at a pace set by the
system, by availability of information, or some other external force. In these cases, use of an SPS
task would itself be artificial. Therefore, it should be noted here that SPS tasks are likely better
candidates for evaluation of multitask detriment in contexts in which the observer is an active,
aggressive seeker of information (as in Sawyer, 1985). In passive contexts, the traditional
vigilance framework offers more benefits. In indeterminate situations, the untested hybrid
SPS/vigilance framework above presents a possible solution. The second concern relates to false
alarm rates, which in cases of multitasking are concealed by the binary response of SPS. When
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three varieties of critical signal are being searched for simultaneously, but only the presence or
absence of such are reported, how may a researcher compute an accurate false alarm rate by
critical signal type? At issue is the question of whether differences between experimental
conditions is are a result of a criterion shift (for example, an inflation of β), or a sensitivity shift
(for example, a decrement to d’). Such inflation and decrements can have counteractive effects,
each canceling the other’s influence. Without accurate false alarm rates, analysis techniques that
might illuminate these differences, such as signal detection analysis, calculations of predictive
power, and construction of ROC curves, are not an analysis option. The loss of these tools is not
ideal, but even without them the SPS tasks provide a superior toolset than is available in
conventional driving distraction inquiry.
SPS tasks satisfy the requirements outlined above. The SPS framework can accurately
specify space/time and the relative concentrations experimental variables within each. It also
supports the free will of the operator to explore the environment at a pace of their own choosing.
SPS tasks show potentials for utility in tasks both basic and applied. In visual search experiments
where stimuli is organized in static slides on a computer screen, movement through the space of
the experiment, the events, can be said to occur at the speed of participant response, or event rate
as a dependent variable. On a roadway, or in a driving simulation, movement through the space
of a roadway environment unfolds more quickly the faster the participant moves through it.
Therefore, consider the division of the driving environment into sections of equal distances,
invisible to the participant but known to the researcher, each considered one event. These ‘eventsections’ could be driven by the participant at a speed (event rate) of their own choosing.
Longitudinal movement, in such a task, connotes movement through events. Note that this
arrangement allows for many of the methodological strategies used in both vigilance and SPS
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tasks. Presentation of stimuli can be assigned a SP in terms of how many event-sections it
appears in, relative to the total number of event-sections. Spatial uncertainty can be built within
the environment, while temporal uncertainty can be built by changing longitudinal location
within an event-section. The ‘speed limit’ described above (from Wolfe et al., 2007) would
become quite literal. Such tasks could overlay traditional driving distraction investigations
without changing their underlying methodology or mechanics. Consider a ‘temporal overlay’,
where in a manner similar to the use of epochs (Sawyer et al., 2014a) or windowing (Morgan &
Hancock, 2011), a researcher would map interactions within a framework of event sections,
revealing the concentrations of independent variables in terms of SP. Notably, data recorded in
simulation or in GPS outfitted vehicles might be retroactively analyzed in this fashion, allowing
for reinterpretation and extension of existing driving datasets. Therefore, SPS tasks satisfy the
final requirement of backwards compatibility to previous methodologies. In the present work,
having identified a framework for use, we will now look its application in driving distraction
inquiry and beyond.

Projected Results and Theoretical Implications
Having settled upon SPS tasks as a framework for distraction inquiry, it is instructive to
look to the body of work already conducted using these techniques, which suggest a significant
additional utility. Wolfe and associates aptly titled “Rare items are often missed in visual
searches” (2005), chronicles their findings regarding a manipulation of SP in visual search, and
relates the pattern to applied situations including baggage screening and radiological screening.
As in vigilance work, low SP critical signals are responded to less often (see Warm & Jerison,
1984). The pattern is not linear; in searches comprising millions of trials (Mitroff & Biggs,
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2014), probability of a given critical signal being presented (SP) plotted against probability of it
being reporting forms a logarithmic relationship (see Figure 6).
Mitroff and Biggs coined the name ‘ultra-rare-item effect’ to describe this logarithmic
prevalence effect in accuracy data, such that accuracy rates remain stable in gradual decay before
divergence toward ever steeper decrement. These signals, it should be noted, may not actually be
perceptually missed. Given the opportunity to correct their searches (Fleck & Mitroff, 2007),
observers reconsider and rectify the majority of the missed rare critical signals, and so it may be
more accurate to say rare critical signals are rarely responded to (Hancock, 2014).

Figure 6: Log pattern of accuracy as a function of signal probability (SP) in Airport Scanner
Detection accuracy as a function of SP for 78 classes of critical signals (diamonds) in the
smartphone game “Airport Scanner”, in which players identify dangerous objects in simulated xray bag footage. Natural logarithm fit of this data is made clear by the trend line. Detection rates
remain fairly high and steady at higher SP, but decay quickly at lower signal rates. The above is
from Mitroff and Biggs, 2014, although a similar pattern exists in the data from Wolfe et al.,
2005. Note that, mathematically speaking, this is a ‘logarithmic growth’ pattern, although the
focus of the above and present work will be on the pattern’s divergence toward lower accuracy.
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Work highlighting the correctable nature of these failures to respond should be viewed in
the context of applied settings. While radiologists might have the time to check their
suppositions again, in all too many contexts failure to respond is tragically uncorrectable. The
ultra-rare-item effect therefore has significant applied relevance, as real-world critical signals of
grave import are often extremely rare (for example see Szalma et al., 2014). Hundreds of hours
of uneventful driving pass before a sudden evasive maneuver is necessary. Hours of email work
pass before a decision about a malicious file is required. Hours, days, months or even years of
uneventful watch in enemy territory pass before a firefight. The same effect can be considered in
relative terms. Per brake action, stop-and-go traffic carries less risk of a rear-end accident than
unexpected braking from a forward vehicle, but both risks increase should the driver engage in
messaging. Likewise, the grim reality of a continuing clash of armies does not carry the same
terror and excitement of a sudden encounter, or the even more disastrous ambush, in which one
side is taken while their attention is elsewhere. Checking the contents of a spam folder carries
less risk than encountering a malicious email in the inbox, even though the concentration of
malicious email within is likely higher. In each of these applied contexts, a lesser danger of high
probability in the environment is contrasted with a more dangerous one of low probability.
Here, then, is a good juncture to discuss why the logarithmic nature of a pattern is a
useful piece of information. The default statistical assumption is that relationships are linear (as
expressed in the general linear model), and as such it is easy to make linearity an assumption
when conceptualizing a given system. When a linear model is fit to a system better expressed
(and better fitting, in terms of R2) as a logarithmic function, the result is an assumption of a
homoscedastic fit of the data, when in fact a systematic form of heteroscedasticity prevails (see
Figure 7). In practical terms, two collateral errors are made in interpretation: overestimation and
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underutilization. The impact of these errors can be significant. For example, the log pattern
created by binary choices in search, effectively eliminating half of the problem in each decision,
reaches solutions much more quickly than a linear approach (see Wolfe, 2012). Such logarithmic
patterns are common in natural systems which attempt to produce optimal result within a set of
constraints. This behavior can be seen graphically: in Figure 7 the bottom of the log divergence
toward minimum performance may come close to the maximum value for the factor of influence,
while the broad, slowly declining top of the curve hugs maximum performance. Such is the case
with the visual search pattern shown in Figure 8A. A linear pattern fit here would represent less
overall success, while wasting area under the line by extending into the illogical areas such as
over 100% hit rate. The benefit of understanding these patterns as logarithmic, therefore, is
precisely superior prediction: by fitting a better model to the data, erroneous heteroscedastic
interpretations are avoided.
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Figure 7: Under-utilization and overestimation in log systems misidentified as linear
When erroneously fitting a linear model to points better modeled by a log function, the
heteroscedastic fit produces two collateral errors result which can skew interpretation. First,
areas of overestimation, in which the linear model overstates performance, and second, an area
of under-utilization, in which the linear model understates performance.

Consider examples where logarithmic interpretation of the data underlying SP-based
signal detection decrements (Figure 8) would provide better proscriptive guidance for design of
equipment or tasks. For example, take the design of algorithmic email filters which remove
malicious emails. Assuming that detection of malicious emails by the operator follows a pattern
such as that shown in Figure 8A, the logarithmic model suggests that there may in fact be a point
at which removing more signals (i.e. removing more malicious emails) actually leads to a greater
probability of the operator failing to detect and so engaging with these cyber-attacks. It could
therefore be desirable to allow 2% or so of such emails through (although presumably defanged)
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so as to allow the human enough ‘signal’ to have a reasonable chance to detect. The linear
interpretation of the data, in this case, overestimates operator performance at low SP and
erroneously suggests that greater removal of signal must always be a net positive. In another
example, assuming that reaction to roadway events by a driver follows a pattern such as that
shown in Figure 8, the logarithmic model sheds light on the previously mentioned real-life
example of stop and go traffic vs the proverbial child running into the road. It becomes clear why
the latter, very rare signal is so much more of a threat. Such understanding is useful for accurate
causal induction, and the resultant deduction of appropriate design.

Figure 8: Log patterns found in single and multitask data from Wolfe and colleagues, 2005
Plotting of single-task data from Wolfe and colleagues, 2005, representing aggregate detection
data of 24 participants completing over 2000 trials. Log functions can be seen for A) single-task
(R2 = .96) and B) multitask (R2 = .96) visual search. In single-tasking the rare critical signals are
least frequently responded to. In multitasking it is the rare critical signals that experience the
greatest decrement relative to their singe-tasking counterparts.

To date, no comparisons have been made between single-task and multitask search in
cases of the ultra-rare-item effect. However, a brief thought experiment will reveal that such is
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happening on the roadways at this very moment. Further, each applied context explored in this
work involves a rare target type, and involves multitasking. To have utility, the SPS tasks used
experimentally must generalize to multitasking. One SPS study, at least, has asked participants to
‘multitask’, although not in pursuit of any multitasking-related research question. Wolfe and
colleagues (2005) were curious if asking baggage handlers to look for common and rare signals
together (i.e.: handguns, hopefully rare, and iPods, quite common) might mitigate the effects of
missed rare critical signals. They therefore asked participants to search for three categories of
critical signal simultaneously (see Figure 8B). They found, not to the surprise of those versed in
driving distraction literature, that simultaneous, multitask search did not mitigate the rare critical
signal issue, but detection rates were in fact lower for all three categories. In comparing this data
(see Table 1) now, a decade later, the comparative patterns of single and multitask trials reveal
further utility for evaluating multitasking based distraction, in driving and other contexts.

Table 1 : Accuracy Data Taken from Wolfe et al., 2005
Signal Probability (%)
1

10

50/44

Single Task

70

84

93

Multitask

48

75

89

Decrement

-22

-9

-4
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Figure 9: Decrement differences in log patterns from Wolfe and colleagues, 2005
A). Decrements between single and triple-task multitasking are plotted. Note that Wolfe et al.
(2005), chose different ‘high’ signal rates for the two experiments plotted (44 vs 50), and so the
rightmost decrement can be considered an approximation which likely overestimates the actual
decrement. B) The decrements from each level are plotted and fitted to a log function (R2 = .96).
In single-tasking, rare critical signals are rarely responded to, and in multitasking it is rare
critical signals which experience the greatest decrement relative to their singe-tasking
counterparts. This rare-multitasking decrement inflicts egregious penalties to detection.

A decrement may be calculated in moving from single to multitasking, analogous to the
type of decrement that might be calculated in a driving distraction study. In this sample, low,
medium and high SP critical signals show high, medium and low decrements to performance in
multitasking (see Figure 9). As such it seems likely that, in terms of detection, rare critical
signals are the most impacted by multitasking. That is to say, 1) in single-tasking rare critical
signals are least frequently responded to, and 2) in multitasking it is the rare critical signals that
experience the greatest decrement relative to their singe-tasking counterparts. It would seem that,
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in multitasking, low SP tasks carry a compound risk of failure. This rare-multitasking decrement,
in the present data, is egregious when considered in the context of practically any applied task.
The pattern of these rare-multitasking decrements themselves constitutes a log function
(see Figure 9B), which mathematically stems from two natural logarithmic patterns offset by
intercept. In practical terms this rare-multitasking effect has substantial applied import, and is not
presently described elsewhere in the literature. Parenthetically, the pattern bears resemblance to
information theory (Shannon, 1948), and to the Hick-Hyman Law (Hick, 1952; Hyman, 1953). It
is also presently constructed from data harvested from a previously published paper (Wolfe et al.,
2005). If the pattern holds in experimentation, it could be useful in predicting the broader pattern
of multitasking-based accuracy decrements, such as driving distraction.

Research Questions
The previous theoretical discussion of distraction covers significant scope. Before stating
formalized hypotheses, it is important to stop and summarize identified areas of exploration and
concepts to be used in the experimental portion of this work. Three major suppositions can be
identified. First, 1) the application of the distraction construct to contexts beyond driving can be
justified and supported. Suggested strategy for making such arguments, including the distracted
trolley, are outlined. Second, 2) the superior control of SP space/time afforded by SPS task
methodology will allow for better understanding of relationship between number of concurrent
tasks, target density, and resultant performance. This performance is best measured in terms of a)
response time, b) accuracy, and c) subjective workload, as measured by the NASA TLX. Third
3), the better understanding provided by use of SPS methodology to investigate distraction in
varying contexts will result in nomothetic principles which span context. Prior research into
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prevalence effects and vigilance has associated lower SPs with lower accuracy, slower response
time (as noted by Fleck & Mitroff, 2007) and higher workload (as in Warm, Parasuraman, &
Matthews, 2008). Accuracy across levels of SP, in past work, were also better fit (in terms of R2)
by a logarithmic function than a linear function (Wolfe et al., 2005 as reinterpreted above,
Mitroff & Biggs, 2014 ). Prior research into driving distraction has likewise associated
performance of concurrent tasks with lower accuracy, slower response time, and higher workload
(Sawyer et al., 2014a).
To explore these research questions, a series of four experiments were conducted. First, I)
a conceptual and much expanded replication of the basic psychophysical experiment performed
by Wolfe et al., 2005 was used explore the relationship between number of concurrent tasks,
target density, and resultant performance. The findings from this experiment were compared to
results gathered in three applied contexts: II) driving distraction, III) battlefield threat detection
and IV) email-based cyberattack.

Overarching Hypothesis Structure
In order to provide a common reference for all experiments and common notation for all
figures, six generalized hypotheses are forwarded (and see Figure 10):
It was hypothesized that 1) higher SP conditions would lead to higher accuracy, 2) faster
(lower) response times, and 3) lower subjective workload. 4) Performing more tasks concurrently
was hypothesized to lead to lower accuracy, 5) slower (higher) response times, and 6) higher
subjective workload.
The individual experiments may also have additional hypotheses. For example, the
logarithmic nature of accuracy data at varying SP levels is tested only in experiments which have
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three levels of SP presented at a single level of multitasking. Also, the structure of some
experiments means data is not collected to test all overarching hypotheses, and so experiment
may have non-contiguous hypothesis numbers. This choice was made in order that hypotheses
could be easily compared across experiments. Thus, referring to “hypothesis one” will always
evoke the prediction that higher SP conditions should lead to higher accuracy.

Figure 10: Overarching hypotheses for experiments I, II, III & IV
These hypotheses are common to all four experiments, and choices have been made to allow for
easy comparisons. Hypothesis numbering is consistent throughout, and so experiments which do
not produce data to test all hypotheses will have non-contiguous numbering. Hypothesis figures
here and below will also refer to “quality of performance”, with up-arrows signifying higher
accuracy, faster response time, and lower workload. The first line may be read: “In the
hypothesis one higher SP was predicted to lead to better accuracy performance and in hypothesis
four higher multitasking was predicted to lead to lower accuracy performance.”
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CHAPTER THREE: EXPERIMENTATION & METHODS
Experiment I: Basic Psychophysical SPS Task
This conceptual replication and extension of Wolfe and colleges (2005) had the following
goals: first to replicate the data seen in Table 1, and second to extend this data to include dualtasking. As this experiment is based on a non-applied task, no argument regarding inherit
ontological primacy can or will be made. Instead, an attempt was made to produce and use
stimuli within the task which would relate to an applied setting: driving.
It was desirable to avoid saturating more than 50% of candidate events with critical
signals (to avoid moving from a go task to a no-go task, see Helton et al., 2010), and so SP
values of 1%, 10% and 35% were used, which results in a triple-task condition familywise SP of
46%. Due to the instrument’s placement at the end of a trial, TLX values could only be
calculated within a task. As such, TLX scores were necessarily separately analyzed by
multitasking level, collapsed across SP conditions. Finally, the design used (see Figure 11) was
not perfectly symmetrical with regard to the distribution of the 1% SP condition within levels of
multitasking. Specifically, single-task conditions and the triple-task condition each collect data
for the 1% SP only once, while in the dual-task condition it is collected twice. These levels
should not differ significantly, as previous research (Wolfe et al., 2005) has suggested that
concurrent performance of a high SP task with a low one apparently does not affect performance
on the low SP task. As such, the plan is to collapse across the dual-task 1% categories. The result
is a 3 SP (1%, 10%, 35%) x 3 of multitasking level (single, dual, triple) design, within subjects,
with collection of the dependent variables of accuracy, response time and subjective workload
(see Figure 11).
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Figure 11: Blocks presented within-subjects in experiment I
The set includes each SP in single-tasking as well as all novel combinations of SP that include
the 1% reference category. White represents non-signal background stimuli. In order to create a 3
SP (1%, 10%, 35%) x 3 of multitasking level (single, dual, triple) design, the two dual-task 1%
conditions were intended to be averaged. Note: three multitasking levels is not a coincidental
number; it is the minimum to plot a logarithm.
Participants
A sample of 30 participants was recruited from the undergraduate population of the
University of Central Florida, and provided class credit in return for one hour of time. Each held
driving licensure, had 20/20 or corrected vision, and self-reported having no neurological
impairments. Based upon analysis of effect sizes from previous research (Wolfe et al., 2005), this
sample size was more than sufficient to power the present design.
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Apparatus
Informed consent and collection of demographic data was achieved with an internetconnected laptop using Qualtrics (2013). A researcher script was kept in Google Docs, allowing
researchers to see which trial they were on at a glance and also to report any difficulties. Training
and experimental stimuli, as well as data collection, were achieved through use of PsychoPy, an
open source experiment generation suite (Peirce, 2009). The custom PsychoPy script used in the
experiment was run on eight Windows 7 desktops (Figure 12), each with Core2Duo processors,
4GB of RAM, a 128GB SSD, and a 15” external Dell LCD monitor displaying the desktop
environment at 1024x768 resolution. Participants responded via standard Dell ANSI QWERTY
keyboards, accepting input only from the up and down arrow keys; key presses outside of these
keys were ignored. Sound was presented with stereo, over-the-ear closed-back sound isolating
earphones.

Figure 12: Terminals used to run experiment I
The bottom, horizontal monitor was used in experiment III, and in this experiment was powered
off. Al monitors were of similar make, model, and displayed the same resolution.
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Stimuli & Task
Stimuli were taken from the context of driving distraction studies (such as Sawyer et al.,
2014a), and consisted of 40 greyscale images from one of 10 categories: navigation, street signs,
text messages, billboards, passengers, pedestrians, unlit warning lights, cars, lit warning lights,
and braking cars (see Figure 13B). Any category could serve as critical signal or non-signal
stimuli, although in the present experiment only braking cars, text messages and pedestrians
were used as critical signals. In a given block one to three categories would be set as critical
signals, with each displayed at a different SP. The following signal probabilities were used: 1%,
also referred to as “rare critical signals”, 10%, also referred to as “uncommon critical signals”,
and 35%, also referred to as “common critical signals”.

Figure 13: Comparison of past stimuli with that from experiment 1
Stimuli as presented in a single event within A) Wolfe and colleagues (2005) study and B) the
present study. In the former A) the drill just left of bottom-center was the critical signal. In the
latter, B) the pedestrian was the critical signal. The mask applied to A was forgone in the present
experiment.
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Before each block participants viewed a screen informing them which categories would
be critical signals, and how frequently those categories would appear. Candidate stimuli were
displayed on the screen side-by-side in groups of three (Figure 13B). Participants were instructed
to respond using the down and up arrow keys: down to ‘brake’ for critical signals, up to move
forward. Pressing either key advanced the screen to a new event. Auditory feedback was
provided. The sound of wind passing was played for correct key presses, including correct
detections and correct rejections. A buzzer was played for incorrect key presses, including
misses and false alarms. There was no overlap of critical signals; a maximum of one critical
signal was available in each event.
Training occurred at the beginning of the experiment, and consisted of slides bearing
instruction on response buttons, feedback, and how to treat critical signals and background
stimuli. In this training, the experiment was framed as a ‘game’ with ‘levels’. Short training
blocks were conducted, with the following critical signal combinations at an aggregate 50%
probability: braking cars alone, text messages alone, and pedestrians alone, then braking cars and
text messages were presented together, and finally, braking cars, text messages and pedestrians
all presented at the same time. A criterion of 80% accuracy on each of the three single-task
portions of the training block was used to determine whether the participant would be retained to
complete the full study.
Experimental blocks presented are shown in Figure 11. In blocks containing a 1% SP
critical signal, 500 events were presented. In all other blocks 200 events were presented. In the
single-task conditions, the following blocks were presented: braking cars at 1%, 10% and 35%,
text messages at 10%, and pedestrians at 35%. In all multi-task blocks 1% critical signals were
braking cars, 10% critical signals were text messages, and 35% critical signals were pedestrians.
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At the conclusion of each block, a NASA TLX asking about “your experience in the last level”
was completed by the participant. Timestamps for all key-presses were recorded, allowing for
the coding of accuracy and response times.

Procedure
Participants were run in groups of up to 8. After group informed-consent, participants
were provided time to ask questions. Each was asked to power off and surrender all electronics
capable of producing any alert, including watches, which were held until the conclusion of the
experiment. Each participant sat at a separate computer station. Training was followed by
experimentation, as previously described. At the end of experimentation, participants were
debriefed, and released.

Experiment-Specific Hypotheses
The following specific hypotheses were forwarded for experiment I (see Figure 14):
1) Higher SP conditions would lead to higher accuracy, 2) faster (lower) response times.
4) Performing more tasks concurrently would lead to lower accuracy, 5) slower (higher) response
times, and 6) higher subjective workload. 7) Within a level of multitasking, the pattern of SP
related accuracy changes would be better fit (in terms of R2) by a logarithmic function than a
linear function.
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Figure 14: A visual representation of the hypotheses for experiment I
The first line may be read “In terms of accuracy, “Higher signal probability (SP) conditions were
hypothesized to lead to better performance, higher multitasking was hypothesized to lead to
poorer performance.” Please note, as no SP independent TLX data was expected, no SP specific
TLX hypothesis (3) was forwarded.
Experiment II: SPS Task - Multitasking in Driving Simulation
The second experiment was conducted in the context of driving, a context named for the
well accepted ontological primacy of the driving task. Methodologically, it was modeled on
driving simulation pace-car experiments (esp. Sawyer et al., 2014a) and adapted to fit an SPS
framework. Participants drove and received text messages, and were tested in reaction time by a
braking lead vehicle. A ‘temporal overlay’ of event sections allowed the control and
measurement of SP for both of these events. As in experiment I, the dependent variables of
interest were accuracy (in terms of collision avoidance) and response time of the 1% signal, a
stopping car. Two levels of dual-task performance were tested, one pairing 1% brake and 1%
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text SP, one pairing1% brake and 10% text SP. This led to three conditions to be evaluated
between subjects (see Figure 15). False alarm rate was not calculated, as use of the brake
defensibly occurs in driving speed maintenance. TLX scores were recorded following each
participant’s drive. Speed over time was likewise collected; in the present experiment the sum of
response times was not equivalent to ER, although they would covary to some extent.

Figure 15: Task combinations in experiment II
All conditions are to be evaluated between-subjects. The set includes single-task, baseline ‘brake
only’ condition and two levels of dual-task performance, one pairing 1% brake and 1% text SP,
one pairing1% brake and 7% text SP. White represents background (non-critical) event-sections.
Participants
A sample of 36 participants was recruited from the undergraduate population of the
University of Central Florida, and provided payment of 10 dollars in return for thirty minutes of
time. All were required to hold driving licensure, to have 20/20 or corrected vision, and to self-
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report having no neurological impairments. This sample size was based upon analysis of effect
sizes from previous research (Sawyer & Hancock, 2013).

Apparatus
Informed consent and collection of demographic data was achieved with an internetconnected laptop using Qualtrics (2013). A researcher script and schedules coordinating
researchers was kept in Google Docs, allowing researchers to see which trial they were on at a
glance, and also to report any difficulties.
Stimuli, in the form of a virtual driving environment, was generated by a fixed platform
PatrolSim driving simulator with a 270 degree rear-projected field of view. The stock PatrolSim
software was modified to allow delivery of text messages according to the x, y position of the
participant’s vehicle within the simulated environment (see Sawyer et al., 2014a; Sawyer et al.,
2015a). Such messages could be delivered to and received on a smartphone running Android 4.4
and a specially designed app, visually similar to the stock android messaging app (Figure 16).
All participant interaction with the smartphone and simulator was recorded by a purpose-built
application at a rate of 60 Hz (for more information see Sawyer & Hancock, 2012; Sawyer et al.,
2015a). The messaging app was modeled after the stock SMS application included with Android
4.4, which itself has similar appearance and functionality to the messaging application included
with Apple iOS. Message delivery to the smartphone could be triggered by the participant’s
physical location in the simulation.
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Figure 16: Smartphone app used in the driving study
A screenshot of the native Android app displaying the text messaging task from the present
study. This tool allowed not only for the delivery of text messages, but for millisecond precision
records of all user interactions (as in Sawyer et al., 2015a).
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Stimuli & Task
The virtual environment used for this experiment consisted of a 5.4 mile stretch of threelane highway posted at 65 MPH, at which speed it could be driven in 5 minutes. The
environment was sub-divided into 100 event-sections (see Figure 17), each comprising 3 seconds
of driving at 65 MPH or 285.5 feet. As such, a desired SP could be assigned to a task based upon
the number of event-sections in which it appeared. Critical signals and background stimuli, both
in the simulation environment and presented through the phone, were delivered within eventsections with some temporal uncertainty: they could be presented at ‘0’ feet, or 100 feet, or 200
feet. This uncertainty allowed the presentation of critical signals and background stimuli within
event- sections to be less predictable to the participant. There was no overlap of critical signals,
either brake or messaging; a maximum of one was available in each event-section.

Figure 17: Use of event-sections to control signal probability (SP) in a driving study
Shown here are nine of a sequence of 100 event-sections (A), each comprising 3 seconds of
driving at 65 MPH (285.5 feet). The participants, although trained to drive the prominently
displayed speed limit of 65 MPH, could drive their vehicle (B) through the environment at the
speed of their choosing. As such, when at the beginning of critical event-section C a lead vehicle
was presented stopped in the road 2 seconds of driving distant at 65 MPH (190.36 feet) (D) the
following was true: 1) each participant had the same amount of space, but dependent of speed of
travel, different amounts of time to react, 2) perception, action, and a result of either hitting or
missing the car was carried out within the single event section, and 3) the SP (SP) of the
interaction could be quantified at 1% of the 100 available sections in which the stopping car
stimuli might have been presented.
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The task was modeled after a driving distraction pace-car study. Background stimuli were
only presented in the simulation- all text messages were signals. Such background stimuli were
presented in 19% of event-sections, in the form of billboards, pedestrians, and signage. A single
critical event-section (SP 1%) triggered the appearance of a stopped car, brake lights lit, in the
lane at a distance of 190.36 feet, or 2 seconds at 65 MPH. To minimize the non-environmentally
correct and potentially saliency enhancing experience of having a vehicle appear in front of the
driver, night-time conditions including rain and dense fog were included in the simulation, such
that forward visibility was limited to around 200 feet. Response times and accuracy (in the form
of collision avoidance) were recorded. A crash sound was played when participants failed to
avoid collision, as they collided with the pace car. Textual critical signals, “messages”, were in
the form of simple mathematical questions (i.e. “What is seven minus four?”). Participants drove
under conditions of receiving no signal text messages, rare text messages (SP 1%, a single eventsection), or uncommon text messages (SP 7%, 7 event-sections).

Procedure
Participants were run individually. After informed-consent, including time to ask
questions, each was asked to power off and surrender all electronics capable of producing any
alert, including watches, which were held until the conclusion of the experiment. Each
participant then engaged in 1) messaging training, 2) driving training, 3) a single experimental
drive, and 4) exit demographics. In text message training a) the participant practiced using the
phone to receive text messages and send replies. Ten training math problems to be responded to
were sent. In driving training b) the participant was instructed in how to start and shift the
simulator to drive, then drove for five minutes through an environment that included the
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necessity to steer, brake, and maintain a speed of 65 MPH. Next, c) the participant engaged in an
experimental drive under one of the three conditions above (Figure 15). Finally, the participant
completed d) a NASA TLX and demographic questionnaire, which included debriefing.

Experiment Specific Hypotheses
The following specific hypotheses were forwarded for experiment II (see Figure 18):
First it was hypothesized that 1) higher SP would lead to higher accuracy, 2) faster
(lower) response times, and 3) lower workload. Dual-tasking would lead to 4) lower accuracy, 5)
slower (higher) response times, and 6) higher workload. It was also hypothesized that 7) these
data would produce patterns consistent with the basic pattern seen in experiment I.

Figure 18: Hypotheses for experiment II
The first line may be read “Higher SP conditions were hypothesized to lead to better
performance in accuracy, higher multitasking was hypothesized to lead to poorer performance in
accuracy.”
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Experiment III: SPS Task - Battlefield Threat Detection
In dismounted military contexts, mission success may rely on timely action not only in
the immediate environment, but in monitoring remote data not in semantic context to the
operator’s present location. Such multiple-display multitasking degrades task performance in
other domains, (Fischer & Haines, 1980; Wickens & Long, 1994, Sawyer et al., 2014a),
elevating workload, and reducing the stable load level that can be sustained over time. While
consideration has been given to what sizes of display best facilitate performance of cognitive
tasks (Hancock, Sawyer, & Stafford, 2015), very little research exists evaluating such battlefield
displays in terms of distraction potential (Yeh, Wickens & Seagull, 1999). Unintended,
iatrogenic consequences (as in Hancock, 2013) to behavior, task performance, and collateral risk
are likely effects of such displays. Soldiers with chest-mounted smartphones or helmet mounted
displays arguably shoulder the risk of distraction in pursuit of their duties.
The present experiment was conducted within a dismounted battlefield context, and
involved detecting and reporting threats, both in an immediate world environment and in remote
data delivered to a digital display. Designers of wearable information-delivery systems often
think of visual interface elements in terms of layers (as in Roberts et al., 2012; see Figure 19),
and in such a paradigm, the real world can be considered the final layer. It should also be
considered the most important, as attention to critical signals in the real world battlefield
environment protects against a variety of lethal environmental hazards, including improvised
explosive devices (IEDs) and enemy combatants. In the present experiment, available signals
emanated from either a ‘world layer’, meant to represent the participant’s immediate
environment, or the ‘digital display layer’, meant to represent a chest-mounted display. The
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digital display layer was divided into two streams of remote data: the first was a video downlink
(VDL) displaying images, the second was a text message feed delivering enemy movement
information. Participants were instructed to treat detection of critical signals from the real world
layer as the primary task, and accuracy, response time in this layer were the dependent variables
of interest, for performance here was representative of human performance in classifying
dangerous threats.

Figure 19: Digital information sources overlay the real world
A graphical interface for a digital display in the near domain in attentional competition with a
real world scene in the far domain. The dangers present in the real world far domain, including
enemy combatants, must be weighed against the value of information in the near domain.
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Three sources of critical signals were available; 1) the primary real-world layer, and
within the digital layer both 2) a video downlink (VDL), and 3) a text message feed. Signal
probabilities were set as close as possible to levels identified by subject matter experts as
applicable to real dismounted battlefield situations, although it should be noted that even a 1%
SP was deemed high compared to hostile environments where targets may appear with days or
weeks between.

Table 2 : Experiment III Signal Probabilities by Condition and Source
Source
Real

Digital

World VDL Text

FWSP

World Baseline (1T01%)

1%

0%

0%

1%

Low Digital All (3T03%)

1%

1%

1%

3%

High Digital All (3T21%) 1%

10% 10% 21%

Measures of subjective workload were collected following each trial. Accuracy and
response times for the world layer, therefore, were analyzed as a 3 SP load (world baseline, low
digital all, and high digital all) within-subjects repeated measures design. In this design (see
Table 2) differences between the world baseline and low digital all conditions were intended to
be indicative of ramping concurrent tasks from one to three, while changes between the low and
high digital all conditions were intended to be indicative of ramping SP from 3% to 21%.

61

Participants
Twenty participants were recruited from the undergraduate population of the University
of Central Florida, and provided class credit in return for one hour of time. Each held driving
licensure, had 20/20 or corrected vision, and self-reported having no neurological impairments.
This sample size was based upon analysis of effect sizes from previous research (Wolfe et al.,
2005).

Figure 20: Terminals used to run experiment III compared with actual battlefield interfaces
A) In actual experimentation the lower screen was pulled to the edge of the workstation, the
keyboard moved to the side, and a gamepad held in the hands (and see Figure 21B). B) The
configuration was designed to approximate the visual separation of chest-mounted displays
presently used in dismounted combat situations.
Apparatus
Informed consent and collection of demographic data was achieved with an internetconnected laptop using Qualtrics (2013). A researcher script was kept in Google Docs, allowing
researchers to see which trial they were on at a glance and also to report any difficulties. Training
and experimental stimuli, as well as data collection, were achieved through use of PsychoPy, an
open source experiment generation suite (Peirce, 2009). The custom PsychoPy script used in the
experiment was run on eight Windows 7 desktops (Figure 20), each with Core2Duo processors,
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4GB of RAM, a 128GB SSD, and two 15” external Dell LCD monitors displaying the desktop
environment at 1024x768 resolution.

Figure 21: Detailed terminal configuration for experiment III
A) The top display held the world layer and the primary task: identifying and reporting
individuals holding guns. Below, the data layer held a video downlink (VDL) in which the task
was the same at the primary task, as well as a text message feed in which the task was to identify
the code-word “Baron”. There was no overlap of signals. In this example, the world layer holds a
critical signal in the form of an individual holding a gun. B) Participants sat with the ‘world’
layer positioned ahead, and the data layer pulled to their chest, while a gamepad was held on the
lap. Participants responded via the ‘triggers’, buttons on the upper corners of the gamepad. Key
presses outside of the triggers were ignored. Sound was presented with stereo, over-the-ear
closed-back sound isolating earphones.
Stimuli & Task
Graphical and textual stimuli were used, the former obtained from an Air Force virtual
training environment simulating Kandahar, Afghanistan. A set of fifty static targets, ten holding
guns, was created by taking stills of 3D models (see Figure 21A). Critical signals in graphical
stimuli were defined as any image in which the individual held a gun. Textual stimuli consisted
of fifty messages using call signs to report enemy movement, of which ten used the code-word
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‘Baron’, the critical signal. Graphical stimuli were presented on the forward world layer display,
as well as on the lower horizontal ‘remote data’ display which contained both VDL and textual
message stimuli.
Training occurred at the beginning of the experiment, and consisted of slides bearing
instruction on response buttons, feedback, and when to report critical events. Training blocks
consisted of 50 trials, with all critical signals (world layer gunmen, VDL gunmen, textual
messages) displayed, each at a signal probability of 10%, for a FWSP of 30%. The final training
block was used as a criterion for further participation in the experiment: participants unable to
achieve 80% accuracy were released.
Experimental stimuli was presented in counterbalanced blocks. Before each block
participants viewed instructions about critical signals and the primacy of the world layer. Blocks
consisted of five hundred events. Three stimuli, two graphical, one textual, were evaluated in
each event. Participants were instructed to respond using trigger buttons on a gamepad, left to
report a threat, right to move forward, and either key advanced the screen to a new event.
Auditory feedback was provided: a chime was played for correct key presses, including correct
detections and correct rejections, and a buzzer for incorrect key presses, including misses and
false alarms. There was no overlap of critical signals; a maximum of one critical signal was
available in each event. At the conclusion of each block, a NASA TLX asking about “your
experience in the last level” was completed by the participant. Between blocks participants were
encouraged to take breaks, stretch, and move around. Timestamps for all key-presses were
recorded, allowing for the coding of accuracy and response times. While global false alarms
could be coded, there was no way to know which critical signal they might be associated with.
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Procedure
Participants were run in groups of up to four. Each was asked to power off and surrender
all electronics capable of producing any alert, including watches, which were held until the
conclusion of the experiment. After group informed-consent, participants were provided time to
ask questions. Each was assigned to a separate computer station. Training and experimentation,
as previously described, was followed by debriefing, return of electronics, and release.

Experiment Specific Hypotheses
The following specific hypotheses were forwarded for experiment III (see Figure 22):
It was hypothesized that 1) higher SP conditions would lead to higher accuracy, 2) faster
(lower) response times, and 3) lower subjective workload. 4) Performing more tasks concurrently
would lead to lower accuracy, 5) slower (higher) response times, and 6) higher subjective
workload. It was also hypothesized that 7) these data would produce patterns consistent with
those seen in experiment I.
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Figure 22: A visual representation of the hypotheses for experiment III
The first line may be read “In terms of accuracy, Higher SP conditions were hypothesized to lead
to better performance, higher multitasking was hypothesized to lead to poorer performance.”
Experiment IV: SPS Task - Signal Probability in Cyberattack
The forth experiment was conducted within the context of cyber-defense. The former
Chief Scientist of the US Air Force (AF) described cyberspace as a domain through which all
essential AF operations are performed (Maybury, 2012). In safeguarding this vital space, the
focus of research and intervention has to date most often been on automated algorithmic systems
and human teams of cyber-defenders (as in Finomore, Shaw, Warm, Matthews, & Boles, 2013;
Sawyer et al., 2014b). Such human-machine teaming is responsible for reducing the number and
impact of attacks and identifying those missed, but crucially can never intercept all malicious
messages. Human decisions, rendered by end users, decide whether such attacks are successful.
Email remains a primary form of communication for business and government, despite a
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growing field of competitors. As such, it represents the critical signal of choice for attackers with
the intent of delivering malicious code or harvesting valuable information, respectively referred
to as ‘malware’ and ‘phishing’ attacks. Indeed, it is difficult to think of a military or commercial
operation which does not in some fashion rely on email. The question is, when faced with an
email-delivered cyber-attack, would the operator fail to detect and engage, or ‘reject and report’
the threat?
The question of primacy is more difficult to argue here than in any other context explored
in this work. Certainly, if you asked most people engaged in checking their email what they were
doing, the answer would be “checking my email”. However, it is exactly this kind of response
that pop-up screens used by corporate, military and government mail systems try to overcome,
reminding users that they are first and foremost the guardians of cybersecurity of the
organization ( as in Sawyer et al, 2015). The essential goal of such messages, of online security
training, and of public advertising like The Department of Homeland Security’s “Stop. Think.
Connect.” campaign (Paulsen, McDuffie, Newhouse, & Toth, 2012). Still, in a “distracted
trolley” thought experiment, it is particularly hard to come to the view that email is somehow a
distraction from email-based cyber-attacks. This situation is further complicated by the
inherently highly multi-task nature of the email task, in which evaluating the legitimacy of a
communication is embedded among so many other highly variable subtasks. Indeed, it seems
most arguable that email is the primary task, and that a subtask of that task is rejecting and
reporting email-based cyber-attacks. In light of this conclusion, and of the complex multi-task
nature of the task, no attempt was made to manipulate the number of concurrent tasks. Instead, a
purely SP based manipulation was conceived, to better understand if the prevalence effect might
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be applicable even in an operationally complex and diverse task like checking and responding to
email.
In the present experiment, participants role-playing an administrative position with the
fictitious ‘Cog Industries’ received emails either containing or requesting sensitive PDF
attachments. Attack emails, containing either malicious code or improper requests for
information were also delivered. The question, as posed previously, was whether reducing attack
email SP might lead to a counter-productive situation in which more attacks would be
downloaded or uploaded as a result of low user respond-and-report rates than were prevented by
removal. As a result, attack emails at a SP of 1%, 5% & 20% were included among balanced
upload and download background events. This 3 SP manipulation was performed between
subjects. The measure of interest in this case was accuracy, in terms of attack email detect-andreport rate and response time. This design differs from that of experiment II and III; no
manipulation between single and multitasking exists, and no specific distractive influence was
included. Instead, it was intended to see if, in an inherently multi-task domain, mere
manipulation of SP could drive a strong difference between groups.

Participants
A sample of 33 participants was recruited from the undergraduate population of the
University of Central Florida, and provided class credit in return for ninety minutes of time. All
were required to have 20/20 or corrected vision, and to self-report having no neurological
impairments. This sample size was based upon analysis of effect sizes from previous research
(Sawyer et al., 2015b).
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Apparatus
Informed consent and collection of demographic data was achieved with an internetconnected laptop using Qualtrics (2013). A researcher script and schedules coordinating
researchers was kept in Google Docs, allowing researchers to see which condition they were in at
a glance and also to report any difficulties.

Figure 23: An attack email, as presented in the email testbed
A) The interface of the email testbed (ET) was designed to mimic common online webmail
interfaces, and to be minimal. In this email the inbound address, ending in ‘.tv’, the attachment,
ending in .exe, and the body of the email, lacking a signature, all point to the suspicious nature of
the email. B) (Inset) Participants at individual terminals interacted with the ET. Should a
participant click on the executable, a miss would be recorded. Should the participant click on the
red “Report” button, a hit would be recorded.

Stimulus, in the form of simulated emails, was delivered through the email testbed (ET,
Figure 23), which was designed to mimic online webmail. After opening an email in the inbox,
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participants were able to download attachments, or reply and upload their own attachments. They
could also report suspicious emails with a dedicated button. Upon taking any of these three
actions, they would be returned to the inbox.

Stimuli & Task
Participants received a series of emails, one at a time. All legitimate emails came from
addresses ending in ‘cogind.com’, and asked participants to download a PDF file, or upload an
existing file. Attack emails came from ‘.tv’ addresses, and could be a request to download a nonpdf ‘.exe’ file, or an improper (i.e. from outside the company) request for an upload of a file.
In all, 300 emails were delivered. Depending on condition, attack emails accounted for
1%, 5% or 20% of emails (3, 15 or 60 emails, respectively).

Procedure
Participants were run individually. After group informed-consent, including time to ask
questions, each was asked to power off and surrender all electronics capable of producing any
alert, including watches, which were held until the conclusion of the experiment. The email
testbed (ET) provided a webmail environment with which to test participants (Sawyer et al.,
2015b). Each participant then engaged in 1) interface training, 2) cyber-defense training, 3) the
experimental ET session, 4) finally in exit demographics. In interface training, participants
viewed a PowerPoint presentation stepping them through the interface of the ET. In cyberdefense training, participants viewed slides explaining the sensitive nature of the data they would
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be handling, and giving simple strategies for avoiding attack emails. Finally, the participant
completed a NASA TLX and demographic questionnaire, which included debriefing.

Experiment Specific Hypotheses
The following specific hypotheses were forwarded for experiment IV (see Figure 24):
1) Higher SP conditions would lead to higher accuracy, 2) faster (lower) response times,
and 3) lower subjective workload. 7) The pattern of SP related accuracy changes was expected
be better fit (in terms of R2) by a logarithmic function than a linear function.

Figure 24: A visual representation of the hypotheses for experiment IV
The first line may be read “In terms of accuracy, Higher SP conditions were hypothesized to lead
to better performance, higher multitasking was hypothesized to lead to poorer performance.”
Please note, as there was no manipulation of multitasking level, no multitasking hypotheses are
forwarded (4,5,6). Best performance was expected to be seen in the highest SP condition, with
detection becoming worst in the lowest SP condition, and to be best expressed as a logarithmic
function (7).
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Comparing and Contrasting Experiments I-IV
The goal of varying levels of multitasking and SP in a psychophysical task and three
applied tasks was to understand how concentration of targets in space and time affected accuracy
and response across levels of multitasking. The applied nature of these tasks prevented perfect
parity of experimental features, but an attempt, illustrated in Figure 25, was made to balance
such characteristics. A list of these intentional points of parity follows. In experiments I
(psychophysical) and IV (email) performance at all SP levels was analyzed, in order to better
understand the effects of varying SP. In experiments II (driving), & III (battlefield) the analytical
focus was upon the targets presented at 1% SP, which were theorized to show greatest volatility
in the face of manipulations of SP and task number. In these two experiments, three groups
tested 1) the change between single-task detection of this 1% SP group and a group with
minimally inflated SP but a greater number of tasks, then 2) the change between that group and a
group with greatly inflated SP. Experiment I (psychophysical) was an SPS task with true binary
response, a characteristic shared with experiment III (battlefield). In contrast, both experiment II
(driving) and experiment IV (email) had forms of response (braking and button clicks,
respectively) which while essentially binary in nature, are somewhat more ambiguous. While
neither experiment I (psychophysical) nor experiment IV (email) had deadlines to response, both
experiment II (driving) and experiment III (battlefield) had such restrictions in the time available
to respond, with a failure to respond being counted as a ‘miss’. Finally, experiments I
(psychophysical) and IV (email) had no structural divide in visual attention, as opposed to
experiments II (driving) and III (battlefield), each of which spread attention across multiple
displays.
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Figure 25: Comparisons between experimental features
In order to provide environmentally valid applied settings in which to test the ideas forwarded in
this work, perfect parity of experiments could not be exercised. A subset of fundamental
differences between experiments which were identified as potentially important is given here.
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CHAPTER FOUR: RESULTS
Presented here are interactions and main effects from the four experiments: basic
psychophysical (I), driving (II), battlefield (III) and cyberattack (IV). Effect sizes here are
provided as η2p. While not specifically discussed in this section, pairwise comparisons and
measures of Cohen’s d may be found in Appendix C. Findings for the overarching hypotheses
and interpretation can be found in discussion.

Experiment I: Basic Psychophysical SPS Task
Response Dependent Variables
Data from thirty participants (n = 30, 18 female, 11 male, 1 non-reporting) were included
in the present analysis, after six were removed for non-completion. Please note that some
participants failed to qualify to finish the experiment, as described in methods. Three target types
were presented at different levels of SP (braking cars at 1%, text messages at 10%, pedestrians at
35%) individually (single-tasking), in pairs (dual-tasking), or in threes (triple-tasking). Accuracy
and response times from each of these categories were submitted to a within-participants 3 SP
(1%, 10%, 35%) x 3 multitasking (single, dual, triple) MANOVA. These data are visually
presented in Table 3.
Each visual category of target was presented associated with a single SP, leading to the
risk that greater saliency in a given category of target might masquerade as the effect of the SP
manipulation. As a precaution, two trials were run in which the braking car stimuli used in the
reference 1% category was presented at the 10% and 35% signal probabilities. A within-subjects
MANOVA was then run comparing the braking car stimuli to the two other stimuli sets (text
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messages, pedestrians). Univariate ANOVA results revealed a significant difference for the
pedestrians set only, F(1, 29) = 5.535, p = .026, η2p = .160, such that at an SP of 35%
performance detecting braking cars (M = .885, SD = .023) exceeded performance detecting

Table 3 : Basic Psychophysical SPS Task Dependent Variables
DV

Task

Code

# Task

Single

1T01%

1

1

54.0

4.7

1T10%

1

10

64.2

2.3

1T35%

1

35

83.9

1.7

2T01%

2

1

45.3

2.7

2T10%

2

10

61.9

2.6

2T35%

2

35

84.2

1.6

3T01%

3

1

68.0

4.5

3T10%

3

10

70.6

2.1

3T35%

3

35

83.4

2.2

1T01%

1

1

851

30

Time

1T10%

1

10

820

11

(ms)

1T35%

1

35

675

26

2T01%

2

1

758

16

2T10%

2

10

871

22

2T35%

2

35

666

9

3T01%

3

1

748

14

3T10%

3

10

883

12

3T35%

3

35

716

11

Accuracy
(%)

Dual

Triple

Response

Single

Dual

Triple

FWSP (%) Mean

SE

Note. Dual-task scores at 1% SP reflect averaging of 1% scores from two conditions (1% &
10%, 1% & 35%). Standard errors calculated as within-participants confidence intervals
(Cousineau, 2005).
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pedestrians (M = .839, SD = .031). This leads to the possibility that, in the present experiment,
accuracy values for the 35% SP group may be depressed relative to the 1%SP group. This
decrement is relative to what would be expected from a perfectly saliency-balanced stimuli set.
However, the small effect size and four percentage mean difference reveal this confound as
small, especially in light of the much larger magnitude of the pattern to be reported below. To
compensate for violations of the sphericity assumption, when appropriate the Box correction
(Field, 2009) has been applied to the following results. Where violations of sphericity were
indicated by Mauchly’s Test, degrees of freedom have been adjusted using the GreenhouseGeisser (1959) correction.
A significant interaction of multitasking and SP was seen, Wilks’ Lambda = .276, F(8,
22) = 7.207, p < .001, η2p = .724, and so univariate ANOVA results were interpreted. The
interaction was significant for both accuracy, F(2.570, 74.521) = 4.413, p = .009, η2p = .132, and
response, F(2.797, 81.106) = 6.419, p = .001, η2p = .181. These data suggests that accuracy
decreases as SP decreases, and that the nature of that decrease is greater at lower signal
probabilities. Dual-tasking results in lower accuracy than single-tasking at both the 10% and 1%
signal probabilities, but triple-tasking outperforms both. In terms of response time, the pattern is
less straightforward. At 1% SP poorest (slowest) performance is seen in single-tasking, while at
the 10% and 35% levels of SP, poorest (slowest) performance is seen in triple tasking. A visual
representation and expanded discussion of the pattern can be seen in Figure 26 & 27. Main
effects of both multitasking and SP were significant, but neither are further interpreted here in
light of the significant interaction.
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Figure 26: Accuracy results at each level of multitasking in experiment I
Patterns of accuracy at each level of multitasking for a significant multitasking by SP (SP)
interaction. Note that dual-tasking exhibits poorest performance, followed by single-tasking, and
finally triple-tasking. Error bars represent within-participants confidence intervals (Cousineau,
2005).

Figure 27: Response time results at each level of multitasking in experiment I
Patterns of response at each level of multitasking for a significant multitasking by signal
probability (SP) interaction. It should be noted that faster times in the 1% category can likely be
attributed not to better performance, but to accuracy decrement-related reduced opportunity to
detect targets that might require longer search time. This phenomenon has been previously
described (as in Fleck & Mitroff, 2007). Error bars represent within-participants confidence
intervals (Cousineau, 2005).
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A final analysis was performed to ascertain the log or linear nature of patterns of
workload at each level of SP within a given level of multitasking. Untransformed and loge
transformed data were subjected to linear regression, and the R2 of each result was calculated.
These estimates of fit, presented in Figure 28, make it clear that the patterns seen in the present
data are better fit when treated as linear.

78

Figure 28: Logarithmic and linear fits of accuracy data in experiment I compared
The R2 values for linear fit with and without loge transformation are noted alongside points
associated with each task level (single, dual, triple). In all three, linear fit in the non-transformed
data is superior, suggesting that the pattern of accuracy decrement is linear in nature.
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Subjective Workload Dependent Variables
Data from thirty participants (n = 30, 18 female, 11 male, 1 non-reporting) were included.
Six dimensions of the NASA TLX (mental demand, physical demand, temporal demand,
performance, effort and frustration) as well as the overall workload score were subjected to a
within -participants MANOVA to assess the impact of the three levels of multitasking: single,
dual and triple. To provide the data for this analysis TLX scores from all conditions were
averaged by multitasking level. In cases where participants failed to answer a single subscale it
was replaced with the average for the condition. Resultant descriptive statistics are reported in
Table 4. Where violations of sphericity were indicated by Mauchly’s Test, degrees of freedom
have been adjusted using the Greenhouse-Geisser (1959) correction. No effects of gender or
order were seen.
A significant main effect of multitasking was seen: Wilks’ Lambda = .339, F(12, 18) =
2.922, p = .020, η2p = .661. Univariate ANOVA results were therefore interpreted, revealing a
significant effect for the composite TLX, F(2, 58) = 13.677, p < .001, η2p = .320, and subscales
including mental demand, F(1.559, 45.205) = 23.537, p < .001, η2p = .448, physical demand,
F(1.592, 46.182) = 7.104, p = .004, η2p = .197, performance, F(2, 58) = 10.757, p < .001, η2p
= .271, effort, F(2, 58) = 13.446, p < .001, η2p = .317, and frustration F(2, 58) = 5.959, p = .004,
η2p = .170. No significant effect was seen for temporal demand, which may reflect the self-paced
nature of the task. Overall, these data support the view that subjective workload is elevated
primarily by the shift from single to double-tasking, which is in line with accuracy and response
results. Visual representations and further discussion can be found in Figure 29.
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Table 4 : Basic Psychophysical SPS Task TLX
DV

Task

Mean

SE

TLX

Single

50.742

0.645

Dual

58.044

1.138

Triple

60.211

1.644

Single

51.587

1.154

Dual

68.100

2.051

Triple

69.800

2.303

Single

25.380

1.448

Dual

38.167

2.435

Triple

38.067

3.345

Single

54.647

0.999

Dual

60.100

2.185

Triple

62.900

3.750

Single

64.353

0.955

Dual

52.400

1.784

Triple

53.867

2.336

Single

47.320

1.054

Dual

59.400

1.934

Triple

64.533

3.010

Single

61.167

1.267

Dual

70.100

2.338

Triple

72.100

2.640

TLX Mental

TLX Physical

TLX Temporal

TLX Performance

TLX Effort

TLX Frustration

Note. These data are computed by averaging across all three single task conditions, both dual
task conditions, and reporting the triple task condition directly. Standard errors calculated as
within-participants confidence intervals (Cousineau, 2005).
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Figure 29: TLX scores at each level of task number in experiment I
Significant subscales are in black, non-significant in white. These data are computed by
averaging across all three single-task conditions, both dual-task conditions, and reporting the
triple-task condition directly. Note that the largest change is due to the change from single to
dual-tasking, not dual to triple-tasking. Error bars represent within-participants confidence
intervals (Cousineau, 2005).

Experiment II: SPS Task - Multitasking in Driving Simulation
Response Dependent Variables
Data from thirty-six participants (n = 36) were included in the present analysis.
Descriptive statistics for all response dependent variables are reported in Table 5. Two response
variables related to the driving task (collision, hybrid response time) were analyzed using a
between-participants MANOVA to assess the impact of a single manipulation, the presentation
of text messages in three levels of familywise SP relative to total event sections driven: driving
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only (0%), infrequent (1%) and frequent messages (7%). The pace car brake event was
consistently presented in a single event section driven, for an SP of 1%.

Table 5 : SPS Task - Multitasking in Driving Simulation Dependent Variables
DV

Code

# Task

Result
FWSP (%)
1

Mean

SD

1

FWSP
(%)
1

Collision

1T01%

51.1

11.9

(%)

2T02%

2

2

11

27.4

11.6

2T08%

2

8

61.3

4.9

12.1

HRT

1T01%

1

1

1

599

113

(ms)

2T02%

2

2

11

1007

110

2T08%

2

8

61.3

1103

115

Note. FWSP (Signal Probability) reports the number of event sections in which any task was
provided. Result FWSP reports the average number of event sections in which a participant
was engaged in a task. Because the brake car task was necessarily responded to in a single
event section, the entirety of this difference can be attributed to the amount of time it took
participants to complete messaging tasks.

Participants were free to indulge in the text messaging task at their own pace, and as a
result three concerns were investigated. First, participants might text-message slowly enough to
still be engaged in the task when the pace car brake event occurred, but no such overlaps were
found. Second, the higher FWSP conditions might cause participants to compensate by driving
much more slowly. Mean speed in MPH at each condition was calculated: driving only M =
67.30, SD = 1.74, infrequent messages M = 67.02, SD = 4.54, and frequent messages M = 67.34,
SD = 3.86. These manipulation checks led to the conclusion that participants performed in
keeping with the intentions of the experiment.
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No effects of gender were seen, and as each participant engaged in only one drive there
were no effects of order. To compensate for violations of the sphericity assumption, when
appropriate the Box correction (Field, 2009) has been applied to the following results. The
operating system of each participant’s own phone was introduced as a covariate to account for
the familiarity that android users had with our android-based texting application. This covariate
was significant, Wilks’ Lambda = .712, F(2, 31) = 6.261, p = .005, η2p = .288.

Figure 30: Collisions and response time results across conditions in experiment II
Collision rate is compared with hybrid response time across three conditions. Note that
collisions, which can be considered the inverse of accuracy (see text), are reduced over the
transition to dual-tasking, and again when the messaging task is expanded sevenfold. This is in
spite of poorer response performance, in which the largest change is that shown from single to
dual-tasking. In sum, a cost to response time is balanced against an increased chance that the
participant will respond at all.
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There was a significant main effect of condition, Wilks’ Lambda = .618, F(4, 62) =
4.220, p = .004, η2p = .214. Univariate ANOVA results were therefore interpreted, revealing the
effect to be significant as related to both response variables: collision F(2, 32) = 3.455, p = .044,
η2p = .178 and hybrid response time, F(2, 32) = 5.375, p = .010, η2p = .251. See Figure 30 for a
visual representation. These data indicate that, consistent with previous driving distraction
research, response time increases with the addition of the messaging task, and when the
prevalence of that task is raised response time further increases. However, collision rates
concurrently decrease, a pattern consistent with vigilance findings showing that rare signals are
less likely to elicit a response.

Subjective Workload Dependent Variables
Data from thirty-four participants (n = 34) were included, as two records were removed
for excessive incomplete responses. In cases where participants failed to answer a single subscale
it was replaced with the average for the condition. Resultant descriptive statistics for all
subjective workload variables are reported in Table 6. Six dimensions of the NASA TLX (mental
demand, physical demand, temporal demand, performance, effort and frustration) as well as the
overall workload score were subjected to a between-participants MANOVA to assess the impact
of the presentation of text messages in three levels of SP: driving only (0%), infrequent (1%) and
frequent messages(7%). No significant effects were seen.
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Table 6 : SPS Task - Multitasking in Driving Simulation TLX
DV

Code

# Task

TLX

1T01%

TLX Mental

TLX Physical

TLX Temporal

TLX Performance

TLX Effort

TLX Frustration

Result
FWSP (%)
1

Mean

SD

1

FWSP
(%)
1

37.858

3.651

2T02%

2

2

11

40.642

3.572

2T08%

2

8

61.3

48.573

3.676

1T01%

1

1

1

43.670

5.004

2T02%

2

2

11

40.549

4.895

2T08%

2

8

61.3

63.840

5.037

1T01%

1

1

1

20.157

6.246

2T02%

2

2

11

20.176

6.109

2T08%

2

8

61.3

29.108

6.288

1T01%

1

1

1

20.777

6.519

2T02%

2

2

11

26.659

6.377

2T08%

2

8

61.3

39.564

6.563

1T01%

1

1

1

71.615

7.783

2T02%

2

2

11

64.419

7.613

2T08%

2

8

61.3

64.875

7.836

1T01%

1

1

1

39.596

6.931

2T02%

2

2

11

50.032

6.780

2T08%

2

8

61.3

57.637

6.978

1T01%

1

1

1

31.334

9.468

2T02%

2

2

11

42.018

9.261

2T08%

2

8

61.3

36.413

9.531

Note. Non-significant TLX data trends toward increased demand for higher multitasking and
higher signal probability.
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Experiment III: SPS Task – Battlefield Threat Detection
Response Dependent Variables
Data from twenty participants (n = 20) were included in the present analysis. Descriptive
statistics for all response dependent variables are reported in Table 7. A within-participants
MANOVA assessed the impact of a single manipulation, the presentation of visual targets and
text messages on a secondary digital display in three levels of SP: monitoring the world baseline
(1T01%), low digital all (3T03%) and high digital all (3T21%). Response measures were
captured only within the ‘world’ display, and included accuracy and response time. No effects of
gender or order were seen.

Table 7 : SPS Task - Battlefield Threat Detection Dependent Variables
DV

Code

# Task

FWSP (%)

Mean

SE

Accuracy

1T01%

1

1

74.0

5.9

(%)

3T03%

3

3

44.0

5.7

3T21%

3

21

56.0

5.3

Response

1T01%

1

1

672

21

Time

3T03%

3

3

768

30

(ms)

3T21%

3

21

774

41

Note. Standard errors calculated as within-participants confidence intervals (Cousineau, 2005).
There was a significant main effect of condition, Wilks’ Lambda = .404, F(4, 16) =
5.905, p = .004, η2p = .596. Univariate ANOVA results were therefore interpreted, revealing the
effect to be significant as related to both response variables: accuracy F(2, 38) = 5.865, p = .006,
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η2p = .236 and response time, F(2, 38) = 3.670, p = .035, η2p = .162. These data indicate that
response time, consistent with distraction research, increases with the addition of the digital
display task, but when the prevalence of that task is raised response time does not significantly
increases. Accuracy likewise significantly suffers with the addition of the digital display task, but
is unaffected by further elevation of SP. See Figure 31 for a visual representation.

Figure 31: Accuracy and response time across conditions in experiment III
Note that the largest change in accuracy occurs in the transition from single to triple-tasking; the
trend toward improved performance seen in increased signal probability (SP) is non-significant.
The largest change in response likewise occurs in the transition from single to triple-tasking.
Error bars represent within-participants confidence intervals (Cousineau, 2005).
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Subjective Workload Dependent Variables
Data from twenty participants (n = 20) were included. Descriptive statistics for all
subjective workload variables are reported in Table 8. Six dimensions of the NASA TLX (mental
demand, physical demand, temporal demand, performance, effort and frustration) as well as the
overall workload score were subjected to a within-participants MANOVA to assess the impact of
the presentation of visual targets and text messages on a secondary digital display in three levels:
monitoring the world baseline (1T01%), low digital all (3T03%) and high digital all (3T21%).
No effects of gender or order were seen.
A significant main effect of condition was seen: Wilks’ Lambda = .302, F(12, 66) =
4.503, p < .001, η2p = .450. Univariate ANOVA results were therefore interpreted, revealing a
significant effect for the composite TLX, F(2, 38) = 13.015, p < .001, η2p = .407, and all
subscales including mental demand, F(2, 38) = 16.004, p < .001, η2p = .457, physical demand,
F(2, 38) = 3.308, p = .047, η2p = .148, temporal demand, F(2, 38) = 10.384, p < .001, η2p = .353,
performance, F(2, 38) = 25.189, p < .001, η2p = .570, effort, F(2, 38) = 13.514, p < .001, η2p
= .416, and frustration F(2, 38) = 15.350, p < .001, η2p = .447. Visual representations can be
found in Figure 32. In aggregate, these data indicate that subjective workload is elevated both by
the need to engage in multitasking by monitoring the digital display, and by elevation of SP
within the digital display.
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Table 8 : SPS Task - Battlefield Threat Detection TLX
DV

Code

# Task

FWSP (%)

Mean

SE

TLX

1T01%

1

1

41.729

2.142

3T03%

3

3

51.761

2.041

3T21%

3

21

57.230

1.137

1T01%

1

1

37.261

5.135

3T03%

3

3

63.223

3.861

3T21%

3

21

73.596

1.998

1T01%

1

1

15.191

2.759

3T03%

3

3

17.499

2.030

3T21%

3

21

24.495

1.992

1T01%

1

1

52.420

3.502

3T03%

3

3

68.431

2.320

3T21%

3

21

72.596

2.231

1T01%

1

1

80.459

5.245

3T03%

3

3

40.196

3.385

3T21%

3

21

39.204

2.748

1T01%

1

1

39.570

4.718

3T03%

3

3

62.955

3.661

3T21%

3

21

70.937

2.554

1T01%

1

1

25.476

4.902

3T03%

3

3

58.263

4.342

3T21%

3

21

62.551

3.392

TLX Mental

TLX Physical

TLX Temporal

TLX Performance

TLX Effort

TLX Frustration

Note. Standard errors calculated as within-participants confidence intervals (Cousineau, 2005).
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Figure 32: TLX scores across conditions in experiment III
Note that the largest change is due to the change from single to triple-tasking, not the increase
from 3% to 21% signal probability (SP) within triple-tasking. Error bars represent withinparticipants confidence intervals (Cousineau, 2005).

Experiment IV: SPS Task - Signal Probability in Cyberattack
Response Dependent Variables
Data from thirty-three participants (n = 33) were included in the present analysis, after
two were removed for non-completion and a third was removed for excessive flagging of emails.
Descriptive statistics for all response dependent variables are reported in Table 9. Two email
attack types: one providing a malicious download and the other requesting an improper upload
were presented within subjects at three levels of SP, between subjects. Collected response
variables included accuracy and response time to attack emails of both types, but as no
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significant differences between performance in these attack types was seen they were analyzed
together. These data were submitted to a within-between participants MANOVA to assess the
impact of these two manipulations in a 2 attack type (upload, download) x 3 SP (1%, 5% and
20%) design. To compensate for violations of the sphericity assumption, when appropriate the
Box correction (Field, 2009) has been applied to the following results. No effects of gender or
order were seen.

Table 9 : SPS Task - Signal Probability in Cyberattack Dependent Variables
DV

Code

# Task

SP (%) Mean

SE

Accuracy

MT01%

M

1

45.5

10.8

(%)

MT05%

M

5

86.6

10.8

MT20%

M

20

78.0

10.8

Response

MT01%

M

1

7305

601

Time

MT05%

M

5

5160

631

(ms)

MT20%

M

20

4796

601

Note. The email task is multitask in nature, and was not manipulated in the present
experiment.

No significant interaction or main effect of attack type were seen, but a significant main
effect of SP did emerge, Wilks’ Lambda = .572, F(4, 58) = 4.671, p = .002, η2p = .244. Betweensubjects ANOVA results were therefore interpreted, revealing the effect to be significant as
related to both response variables: accuracy F(2, 30) = 4.058, p = .028, η2p = .213 and response
time, F(2, 30) = 4.995, p = .013, η2p = .250. See Figure 33 for a visual representation. These data
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indicate that when the prevalence of attacks was raised response time decreased while accuracy
increased.

Figure 33: Accuracy and response time across conditions in experiment IV
Note that the large accuracy gain seen between 1% and 5% is significant, while the small drop
between 5% and 10% is not. The email task is multitask in nature. The pattern of response, in
which that the largest change is due to the change from 1% to 5% SP, should be considered in
light of this fact. Many steps and decisions must be made, but at any time the participant can
make the decision to end that process and report the email.

Subjective Workload Dependent Variables
Data from thirty-three participants (n = 33) were included. Descriptive statistics for all
subjective workload variables are reported in Table 10. Six dimensions of the NASA TLX
(mental demand, physical demand, temporal demand, performance, effort and frustration) as well
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as the overall workload score were subjected to a between-participants MANOVA to assess the
impact of the presentation of attack emails at three levels of SP: 1%, 5% and 20%. No effects of
gender or order were seen. No significant effect of SP was seen: Wilks’ Lambda = .662, F(12,
50) = .955, p = .503, η2p = .186.
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Table 10 : SPS Task - Signal Probability in Cyberattack TLX
DV

Code

# Task

SP (%)

Mean

SD

TLX

MT01%

M

1

27.136

4.872

MT05%

M

5

35.078

4.872

MT20%

M

20

38.364

4.872

MT01%

M

1

26.818

6.548

MT05%

M

5

32.403

6.548

MT20%

M

20

35.091

6.548

MT01%

M

1

8.000

5.697

MT05%

M

5

16.798

5.697

MT20%

M

20

25.545

5.697

MT01%

M

1

30.818

7.963

MT05%

M

5

42.756

7.963

MT20%

M

20

32.364

7.963

MT01%

M

1

45.182

10.840

MT05%

M

5

39.134

10.840

MT20%

M

20

37.091

10.840

MT01%

M

1

25.727

8.010

MT05%

M

5

36.960

8.010

MT20%

M

20

47.000

8.010

MT01%

M

1

26.273

8.747

MT05%

M

5

42.418

8.747

MT20%

M

20

53.091

8.747

TLX Mental

TLX Physical

TLX Temporal

TLX Performance

TLX Effort

TLX Frustration

Note. These non-significant TLX data trends toward increased demand for higher signal
probability conditions, despite the fact that performance was significantly better in lower
signal probability conditions.
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CHAPTER FIVE: DISCUSSION
In the following pages each experiment will be discussed in terms of hypothesized and
reported results, as well as implications. This will be followed by a discussion of which
overarching hypotheses were supported, and the implications of these aggregate patterns.

Experiment I: Basic Psychophysical SPS Task

Figure 34: Hypothesized and reported results for experiment I
The first line may be read: “In the hypothesis one higher SP was predicted to lead to better
accuracy performance and in hypothesis four higher multitasking was predicted to lead to lower
accuracy performance. Results show higher SP led to significantly better accuracy performance
and higher multitasking led to a significant mixed pattern of performance.”

In terms of accuracy, these data (Figure 34) make it clear that it increases as SP increases,
supporting hypothesis one. Performing more tasks concurrently did not lead to lower-accuracy
performance, as suggested in hypothesis four, and greatest performance was instead seen when
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participants searched for three types of targets concurrently, followed by single targets, and two
types of targets. This surprising finding is better illustrated by the interaction shown in Figure 26,
in which the impact of lower SP is significantly greater under conditions of single and dualtasking. This pattern suggests that, when triple-tasking, the decrement associated with low SP
search is lessened as compared to single and dual-tasking. Note that this pattern stands in
opposition to those reported by Wolfe et al. (2005), who investigated a similar scenario in order
to determine if mixing high SP and low SP targets might alleviate the low rate at which rare
targets were detected. In the present experiment concurrent search for the three types of targets
had little effect upon pedestrians, presented at 35%. Significant gains of increasing magnitude
were seen for text messages, presented at 10%, and braking cars, presented at 1%. This suggests,
to use Wolfe’s suggestion (2005), baggage screeners searching for rare guns might benefit from
also searching for more common objects, such as digital music players (iPods). This argument is
a part of a striking overall pattern of accuracy: as participants do more, in terms of SP, the impact
of the number of tasks they engage in grows less. At the 35% level of SP this results in near
parity of accuracy performance (but not of response time performance). As noted before, the
trajectories of these levels of multitasking beyond 35% is a worthwhile question, and will be
identified as a possible future direction for research.
Higher SP led to better response time, as in hypothesis two, only in single-tasking. In
both dual and triple-tasking this pattern fails to hold as faster performance appears to be seen in
the braking cars presented at 1% SP. This pattern may in fact be an artifact of speed-accuracy
tradeoffs: the score calculated is only for correct detections, and very low rates of accuracy seen
at the 1% SP in this experiment may suggest that only participants able to detect and respond
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quickly are measured. The pattern shows very little variance over levels of multitasking, leading
to an inconclusive answer to hypothesis five.
Increases in the number of concurrent tasks led to greater reported workload, supporting
hypothesis six. Note that while participants performed better in terms of accuracy under
conditions of triple-tasking, this is not reflected in their TLX scores. The change from single to
dual-tasking, which had a negative impact upon accuracy performance, was reported as the chief
contributor to elevated workload, suggesting some sensitivity on the part of participants to the
actual pattern of performance.
Hypothesis seven concerned the log nature of the pattern expected within each level of
SP, and was not supported. The best fit, in terms of R2 and as shown in Figure 28, was for a
linear pattern. These data nonetheless show that decrements related to SP are greatest at the
lowest signal probabilities. Level of multitasking here determines the slope of the line describing
the decrement. It is again an interesting question how the pattern behaves at signal probabilities
greater than 35%. One possibility is that the linear trend-lines are correct, and more favorable
levels of multitasking, such as triple-tasking, continue to show an accuracy benefit. In light of the
evidence discussed earlier, it seems more likely that higher signal probabilities show little
difference among multitasking levels. Regardless, as higher SP results in greater performance no
participant can in fact exceed perfect accuracy, and this limitation of reality may in fact render
the entire pattern closer in function to the log fit predicted.
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Experiment II: SPS Task - Multitasking in Driving Simulation

Figure 35: Hypothesized and reported results for experiment II
The first line may be read: “In the hypothesis one higher SP was predicted to lead to better
accuracy performance and in hypothesis four higher multitasking was predicted to lead to lower
accuracy performance. Results show higher SP led to significantly better accuracy performance
and higher multitasking led to a significant better accuracy performance.”

A brief thought experiment will reveal that collision rate can be reframed as the inverse
of accuracy (a collision is a miss in and that appropriate avoidance of the braking car stimuli is a
correct response). As such, higher SP led to better (higher) accuracy (Figure 35), as previously
suggested in hypothesis one. A greater number of concurrent tasks likewise led to better (higher)
accuracy, in opposition to the predictions of hypothesis four, but in support of the pattern
observed in experiment 1 (psychophysical). It is worth noting, as shown in Table 5, that the
calculated FWSP for the 2T02% condition was in fact 11%, and in the 2T08% condition was
61.3%. Because the brake car was necessarily reacted to (or not, in the case of collisions) in the
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space of a single event section, this means that the texting task manipulation occupied 10%,
followed by 60.3% of participants time (and space) on task. All participants finished the texting
task before encountering the braking car. The orderly progression of decreased collisions,
illustrated in Figure 30, is therefore unrelated to so-called structural distraction factors, and
instead a result of hysteresis effects upon the participants cognitive state at the time of brake car
presentation. The greater accuracy at higher SP levels of stimuli presentation is in line with much
previous vigilance research (Mackworth, 1970; Warm & Jerison, 1984; Sawyer et al., 2014b), as
well as visual search investigations of the prevalence effect (Fleck & Mitroff, 2007, Wolfe et al.,
2007). That greater multitasking likewise led to better (higher) accuracy is with little precedence
in the literature, but can be framed in the Hancock & Warm Model of workload as a case of load
lifting a population out of an underload state.
While accuracy increased, response time suffered under higher levels of multitasking as
predicted in hypothesis five. Participants in the 1T01% group were significantly quicker to
respond than those in the 2T02% group. A non-significant trend toward slower response is seen
between the 2T02% and 2T08% groups, indicating that this large ramping of SP in the texting
condition had little effect. The finding that multitasking impacts response time is in line with
much previous driving distraction work (Strayer & Johnston, 2001; Chisholm, Caird, &
Lockhart, 2008; Mouloua, Hancock, Rinalducci, & Brill, 2003; Drews, Yazdani, Godfrey,
Cooper, & Strayer, 2009; Sawyer, 2010; Sawyer & Hancock, 2012; Sawyer et al., 2014). The
lack of contribution to response decrement from greatly expanded levels of exposure (as
measured both by intended and actual SP) to the secondary task is surprising.
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In partial support of hypothesis seven, significant results in experiment II match the
findings from the experiment I basic psychophysical task both in terms of the contribution of SP
to accuracy, and in terms of greater multitasking’s contribution to slower response time.
In the context of driving, these findings in aggregate suggest that while engaging in a
secondary task while driving does impose costs in terms of response time, it may also increase
the likelihood that a driver responds in the first place. Further, the response time decrement may
not significantly vary depending upon the SP of the secondary task, while higher SP involvement
with the secondary task continues to improve likelihood of response and so reduce collisions.
From a practical point of view, this suggests that in situations where secondary tasks are
unavoidable efforts to reduce their frequency may not have the intended effect of reducing
crashes. Further, in situations where roadway obstacles are unlikely to appear without warning,
such as convoy driving, a secondary task may actually be desirable. These ideas should,
however, be understood within the study’s limitations: no structural distraction was tested, and
the impact of situations where the driver looks away from the road at the wrong moment (as in
Sawyer, Calvo, Finomore & Hancock, 2015) are not accounted for.
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Experiment III: SPS Task – Battlefield Threat Detection

Figure 36: Hypothesized and reported results for experiment III
The first line may be read: “In the hypothesis one higher SP was predicted to lead to better
accuracy performance and in hypothesis four higher multitasking was predicted to lead to lower
accuracy performance. Results show higher SP led to a non-significant trend toward better
accuracy performance and higher multitasking led to a significant decline in accuracy
performance.”

In terms of accuracy, the change between the 1T01% and 3T03% conditions resulted in
decreased performance, in line with hypothesis four (Figure 36). Although a trend toward better
performance was seen in the change between the 3T03% and 3T21% conditions, in line with
hypothesis one, it was not significant. In terms of response, the change between the 1T01% and
3T03% conditions resulted in significantly slower performance as expected in hypothesis five,
but in the change between the 3T03% and 3T21% conditions resulted in a non-significant
pattern, and no notable trend. The increase in number of concurrent tasks between the 1T01%
and 3T03% conditions led to greater reported workload, in opposition to hypothesis three. The
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increase in SP between the 3T03% and 3T21% conditions also led to greater reported workload,
supporting hypothesis six.
In partial support of hypothesis seven, significant results in experiment III match the
findings from the experiment I basic psychophysical task in terms of greater multitasking’s
contribution to both slower response time and higher reported workload.
In the context of dismounted battlefield operations, these findings in aggregate suggest
first that engaging in additional tasks results in decrements in identifying and engaging threats.
The decision to impose additional tasks comes at a cost to the primary task of identifying and
appropriately engaging threats. This cost can be compared to multitasking-based distraction in
driving, and should be taken into account when deciding what equipment and tasks are
appropriate for dismounted soldiers. Battlefield distraction shows evidence of endangering
warfighters and mission success alike.
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Experiment IV: SPS Task - Signal Probability in Cyberattack

Figure 37: Hypothesized and reported results for experiment IV
The first line may be read: “In the hypothesis one higher SP was predicted to lead to better
accuracy performance and in hypothesis four higher multitasking was predicted to lead to lower
accuracy performance. Results show higher SP led to significantly better accuracy performance
and higher multitasking led to a significant better accuracy performance.”

This experiment did not manipulate levels of multitasking (Figure 37). As predicted in
hypothesis one, higher SP resulted in significantly higher accuracy. As predicted in hypothesis
two, higher SP resulted in significantly faster response time. Hypothesis three was not supported,
and a non-significant trend was in the direction of higher SP resulting in greater workload.
Hypothesis seven concerned the log nature of the accuracy pattern expected within levels of SP,
and was supported. This log pattern has considerable import in the context of cyberattack and
defense, and these findings in aggregate suggest, as suggested above. There may therefore be an
optimal level of attack signals in order for the human to serve as an effective detector, and at the
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lowest end of SP percentage the drop-off in that efficacy may be logarithmic in nature and
grievous indeed. This log pattern stands in opposition to the pattern found in experiment I
(psychophysical), and adds to the argument that those data may in fact represent a log pattern.
One possibility for this discrepancy lies in the training provided for both studies: in experiment I
participants who could not perform to criterion on the final phase of training were removed from
the study. In the present experiment participants arrived with considerable experience in using
email interface, and no such training measure was required. It is possible that in selecting away
individuals unable to comprehend training, experiment I was deprived of the bottom of its
distribution, producing a linear pattern.
Finally, experiment IV served as a test for the principles for arguing the distractive nature
of a task outlined in chapter 1. Although a decrement was seen in some conditions, the thought
experiment carried out in methods renders it unlikely these can be considered a form of
distraction. One possibility top consider is that is that this is a result of the nature of the
manipulation: SP alone. Mere elevation of a specific subtask’s frequency does not seem to meet
the bar. Distraction is in this work defined a performance decrement in one task are due to
attentional allocation to a concurrent task, and it appears that this concurrent task may in fact
need to be discrete, as is the case in all other experiments here presented

Overarching Hypotheses and Aggregate Patterns
Bridging a common set of research questions across experiments both psychophysical
and applied provided a rich field of results (Figure 38, 39) from which to draw conclusions. In
aggregate, the findings of the four experiments support the supposition that better control of time
(and therefore space) reveals nomothetic principles. Most pronounced among the aggregate
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patterns seen (Figure 39) is that related to overarching hypothesis one (1), which predicted that
higher SP conditions would lead to higher accuracy. This was supported by significant results in
all experiments but III (battlefield), where a non-significant trend is seen. Prevalence effects,
therefore, seem quite robust beyond vigilance settings in applied, operationally complex
contexts. In such contexts, including driving, common wisdom states that requiring humans to do
more leads to greater workload and reduced performance. In contrast, the present pattern
resonates more with the view forwarded by the Hancock-Warm Model (1989), in which greater
arousal may, in situations of underload, lead to improved performance.
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Figure 38: Dependent variable trends as a function of SP and multitasking by experiments
Color coding here allows comparison across manipulation by dependent variable. For example,
by focusing on the white arrows that signify accuracy results in the ‘Higher SP’ column, it can be
seen that in all experiments a significant effect (3) or trend (1) toward higher SP eliciting greater
accuracy was found. Where two arrows are shown, a mixed effect was found. Bars signify no
significant results or discernable trend.
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Figure 39: Overarching hypotheses compared to aggregate patterns
Each result on the right was computed by looking at all significant and trend results from table
38. Where two opposing arrows are shown, mixed results were found.
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This effect of signal probability upon accuracy (Figure 39) is even more interesting in
light of the aggregate pattern found in data relating to overarching hypothesis three (3) and six
(6), which had initially predicted that higher SP would lead to better (lower) workload, while
performing more tasks concurrently would lead to poorer (higher) workload. In all experiments
where such data existed, elevating either SP or number of tasks also led to elevated (poorer)
workload scores. This suggests that humans may be poor judges of the accuracy boost that
accompanies presentation of stimuli at higher signal probability, perhaps employing a heuristic
involving the overall amount of time they find themselves occupied in lieu of some more
accurate assessment of performance. This supposition mirrors a broader question, alluded to
earlier, of whether humans are indeed able to accurately report their own internal states and
experiences (Natsoulas, 1967).
Another aggregate pattern may be found in data relating to overarching hypotheses five
(5), which predicted that performing more tasks concurrently would result in slower (higher in
terms of ms) response times. In both experiments II and III (driving, targeting) significant results
support this hypothesis. This finding, in combination with accuracy and SP findings related to
overarching hypothesis one (1), paints an interesting picture of accuracy and response time as
they relate to SP and multitasking. Consider the possibility that findings from both driving
distraction work and vigilance/prevalence work are correct: accuracy is sensitive to level of
target density (SP) just as response time is sensitive to number of tasks performed (multitasking).
As levels of one are so often dependent upon levels of the other, and because the speed-accuracy
tradeoff might often mask these independent changes, these effects might well have remained
entwined in decades of data. The present dataset is not enough to conclusively make such a
claim, and additional work will be needed to understand the full pattern.
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Of course, we must not neglect the question of distraction itself. Engaging in multiple
tasks increases RT, a finding that spans multiple contexts in the present work. Recall the earlier
definition of distraction: “When, in the course of multitasking, performance decrements in one
task are due to attentional allocation to a concurrent task, the condition can be viewed as a
distraction from the first task.” As such, it is possible that this definition should in fact be limited
to reflect no all response decrements, but response time alone, as mixed results on accuracy were
seen. That said, in a stochastic world in which response time can be ‘tested’ at any level, poorer
response time is, in events which move beyond its threshold, indicative of poorer accuracy. In
these experiments, in order to separate the effects of signal probability and multitasking, criterion
response time was controlled and intentionally long. As such, although we here parse the effects
of SP and MT, in real-world situations there is considerably more noise. As such, the present
results perhaps best generalize to situations where the criterion response time is more often long,
such as long-haul trucking or caravan driving. In light of this, we will retain the original
definition, with one caveat: the prevalence effect can and will exert an influence.
What attracts attention? One interpretation of the present study is that past successes in
signal detection beget enhanced attention to the signal-bearing channel; information-bearing
channels attract future attention. This strategic view of the prevalence effect does rely on the idea
that the enhanced accuracy seen in such tasks is the result of enhanced attention, as opposed to
simply a reduced criterion (beta). It nonetheless fits the foraging profile of organisms in search of
food, mates, and shelter. As information-foraging creatures (predators of information, even),
humans’ propensity to return to rich feeding grounds rings true. It also stands to reason that
humans would not be adept at surviving the information famine of low SP environments,
preferring instead to move to new, more meaning-bearing locale. The present research does not
110

speak to what happens in cases of information-glut, and such might be an interesting future
investigation in pursuit of better supporting the present metaphor.
Looking back upon this work, knowing the outcomes, a number of refinements and
further avenues of study become clear. Such hindsight, for example, might be focused on
repercussions of findings from experiment I (psychophysical), where triple-tasking outperformed
single and dual-tasking, and differences between SP levels at the triple-tasking level were the
smallest of the three groups. Specifically, the strategy employed in experiment III (driving,
battlefield), which tested first the change between single-task detection of a 1% SP group and a
group with minimally inflated SP but a greater number of tasks, followed by the change between
that group and a group with greatly inflated SP. The latter transition, intended to be made at a
level which maximized differences might instead have masked them. Moreover, the findings in
experiment I (psychophysical) beg for an expansion of the number of tasks and range of SP
tested. A full 4x4 or 5x5 design, either performed over many sessions or between subjects, would
provide answers to many of the most perplexing questions to come out of this analysis. In
addition to a larger design, more widely used stimuli and normed stimuli (for example, the
Snodgrass & Vanderwart object pictorial set) might replace the custom-built set specific to the
context of driving used in the present effort. Finally, despite the great effort obviously entailed, it
seems the results detailed here suggest that each applied experiment should be run in an
expanded design as near as possible to that suggested above for experiment I (psychophysical).
Indeed, many similar experiments in varied contexts are recommended, as the construct of
distraction is tested far beyond its original domain of driving.
This work used a novel set of methods across multiple contexts to test a fundamental
human performance question: Would increasing the signal probability (SP) of a secondary task
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increase associated performance, as is seen in the prevalence effect associated with vigilance
tasks? Would it reduce associated performance, as is seen in driving distraction tasks? A series of
experiments weighed these competing assumptions, testing the question in a basic
psychophysical task, as well as in the applied contexts of driving, cyberattack and battlefield
threat detection. In each, and in line with previous prevalence effect inquiry, presentation of
stimuli at higher SP led to higher accuracy. In line with existing distraction work, performance of
higher numbers of concurrent tasks tended to elicit slower response times. In all experiments
raising either number of concurrent tasks or SP of targets resulted in greater subjective workload,
as measured by the NASA TLX, even when accompanied by improved accuracy.
These findings support the view that superior experimental control of signal probability
reveals nomothetic patterns of performance that allow the application of the distraction construct
in diverse contexts beyond driving. The present data in fact make it very clear that the use of SPS
methods, steeped in vigilance methodology, have allowed a much finer-grained view of the
performance trade-offs associated with multitasking-based failures of perception and action.
These data are the result of the use of methods which can precisely account for experimental
variables in time and space by accurately specifying and measuring SP. They are one element
implicating such failures as distraction, even in contexts where the construct has historically been
unused. Tools of actuarial logic for identifying strong cases of task-primacy are the second
element allowing the identification of, for example, battlefield distraction, as a reality in need of
intervention. Beyond this need lie further contexts where distraction holds sway and has vital
costs. It is hoped that the present work will be a foundation for theory and experimentation
allowing identification, intervention, and improved outcomes for related populations.
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APPENDIX C: PAIRWISE COMPARISONS
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Cohen’s d for all pairwise comparisons is here provided (Cohen, 1988 pp. 276-280).
Table 11: Pairwise Comparisons for Experiment I: Accuracy & Response
DV
By Task #
Accuracy
(%)
Response Time
(ms)

By Signal
Probability
Accuracy
(%)
Response Time
(ms)

Sig. *

d

Dual
Triple
Triple
Dual
Triple
Triple

0.173
0.084
0.000*
0.357
0.993
0.245

0.188
0.317
0.512
0.130
0.001
0.163

10%
35%
35%
10%
35%
35%

0.001*
0.000*
0.000*
0.406
0.003*
0.011*

0.413
1.335
1.088
0.593
0.829
1.548

vs.
Single
Single
Dual
Single
Single
Dual

vs.
1%
1%
10%
1%
1%
10%

Note. * indicates significance at the .05 level
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Table 12: Pairwise Comparisons for Experiment I: NASA TLX
DV

Sig. *

d

0.000*
0.000*
0.208
0.000*
0.000*
0.406
0.003*
0.011*
0.973
0.081
0.073
0.570
0.000*
0.002*
0.571
0.000*
0.000*
0.138
0.019*
0.007*
0.456

0.504
0.610
0.128
0.739
0.787
0.066
0.459
0.420
0.003
0.249
0.339
0.109
0.708
0.597
0.081
0.519
0.673
0.186
0.341
0.406
0.070

vs.
TLX

TLX Mental

TLX Physical

TLX Temporal

TLX Performance

TLX Effort

TLX Frustration

Single
Single
Dual
Single
Single
Dual
Single
Single
Dual
Single
Single
Dual
Single
Single
Dual
Single
Single
Dual
Single
Single
Dual

Dual
Triple
Triple
Dual
Triple
Triple
Dual
Triple
Triple
Dual
Triple
Triple
Dual
Triple
Triple
Dual
Triple
Triple
Dual
Triple
Triple

Note. * indicates significance at the .05 level
Table 13: Pairwise Comparisons for Experiment II: Accuracy & Response
DV
Collision
(%)
HRT
(ms)

FWSP
vs.
1%
2%
1%
8%
2%
8%
1%
2%
1%
8%
2%
8%

Sig. *

d

0.160
0.013*
0.193
0.013*
0.005*
0.555

0.344
0.548
0.198
1.122
1.324
0.101

Note. * indicates significance at the .05 level
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Table 14: Pairwise Comparisons for Experiment II: NASA TLX
DV

FWSP

Sig. *

d

vs.
TLX

TLX Mental

TLX Physical

TLX Temporal

TLX Performance

TLX Effort

TLX Frustration

1%
1%
2%
1%
1%
2%
1%
1%
2%
1%
1%
2%
1%
1%
2%
1%
1%
2%
1%
1%
2%

2%
8%
8%
2%
8%
8%
2%
8%
8%
2%
8%
8%
2%
8%
8%
2%
8%
8%
2%
8%
8%

0.546
0.019*
0.060
0.646
0.010*
0.002*
0.967
0.294
0.293
0.527
0.041*
0.125
0.537
0.767
0.754
0.289
0.073
0.401
0.418
0.478
0.940

0.393
1.294
0.882
0.056
1.480
1.661
0.129
0.545
0.501
0.340
0.885
0.670
0.304
0.203
0.093
0.530
1.002
0.445
0.451
0.455
0.058

Note. * indicates significance at the .05 level
Table 15: Pairwise Comparisons for Experiment III: Accuracy & Response
DV

Sig. *

d

0.002*
0.077
0.169

0.947
0.600
0.412

1T01% 3T03%
0.006*
1T01% 3T21%
0.046*
3T03% 3T21%
0.891
Note. * indicates significance at the .05 level

0.837
0.656
0.038

Accuracy
(%)

Level
vs.
1T01% 3T03%
1T01% 3T21%
3T03% 3T21%

Response
Time
(ms)
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Table 16: Pairwise Comparisons for Experiment III: NASA TLX

DV

Level
vs.
TLX
1T01% 3T03%
1T01% 3T21%
3T03% 3T21%
TLX Mental
1T01% 3T03%
1T01% 3T21%
3T03% 3T21%
TLX Physical
1T01% 3T03%
1T01% 3T21%
3T03% 3T21%
TLX Temporal
1T01% 3T03%
1T01% 3T21%
3T03% 3T21%
TLX Performance 1T01% 3T03%
1T01% 3T21%
3T03% 3T21%
TLX Effort
1T01% 3T03%
1T01% 3T21%
3T03% 3T21%
TLX Frustration
1T01% 3T03%
1T01% 3T21%
3T03% 3T21%

Sig. *

d

0.009*
0.000*
0.065
0.003*
0.000*
0.058
0.482
0.049*
0.065
0.004*
0.001*
0.298
0.000*
0.000*
0.846
0.004*
0.000*
0.092
0.001*
0.000*
0.509

0.737
1.259
0.420
0.980
1.489
0.446
0.121
0.459
0.391
0.562
0.723
0.150
1.766
1.893
0.051
0.930
1.412
0.318
1.342
1.477
0.157

Note. * indicates significance at the .05 level
Table 17: Pairwise Comparisons for Experiment IV: Accuracy & Response
DV
By Task #
Accuracy
(%)
Response Time
(ms)

Sig. *

d

0.173
0.084
0.000*
0.357
0.993
0.245

0.188
0.317
0.512
0.130
0.001
0.163

vs.
Single
Single
Dual
Single
Single
Dual

Dual
Triple
Triple
Dual
Triple
Triple

Note. * indicates significance at the .05 level
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Table 18: Pairwise Comparisons for Experiment IV: NASA TLX
DV

Level

Sig. *

d

vs.
TLX

TLX Mental

TLX Physical

TLX Temporal

TLX Performance

TLX Effort

TLX Frustration

1%
1%
5%
1%
1%
5%
1%
1%
5%
1%
1%
5%
1%
1%
5%
1%
1%
5%
1%
1%
5%

5%
20%
20%
5%
20%
20%
5%
20%
20%
5%
20%
20%
5%
20%
20%
5%
20%
20%
5%
20%
20%

0.258
0.114
0.637
0.551
0.379
0.774
0.284
0.037*
0.286
0.298
0.892
0.363
0.696
0.602
0.895
0.329
0.070
0.382
0.202
0.038*
0.395

Note. * indicates significance at the .05 level
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0.446
0.771
0.206
0.238
0.417
0.124
0.623
0.914
0.390
0.444
0.055
0.429
0.169
0.211
0.061
0.428
0.813
0.368
0.528
0.996
0.363
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